AN ANALYSIS OF ARISTOTLE’S PHRONESIS AND INDIVIDUAL HAPPINESS AS EXPRESSED IN THE NICOMACHEAN AND EUDEMIAN ETHICS BY: SOLOMON U. EFFIONG. OP. Introduction The desire for happiness is inherent in every human person. This desire is the driving force of every human action. However, the question often raised, border on what kind of human actions bring about happiness. It is of interest to note that Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, posits that happiness is found in acting in accordance to virtue. Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, transl. by Harris Rackman (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), Bk. I, Ch. 7, 1098 b2- 30. Put differently, the happy life is the virtuous life. To this end, the virtue responsible for ordering the means of moral actions to their proper ends is the intellectual virtue of Phronesis (practical wisdom). Consequently, our aim in this paper is to attempt an analysis of Aristotle’s Phronesis and individual happiness as expressed in the Nicomachean and Eudemian Ethics. In doing this, we shall present Aristotle’s conception of virtue; after which, we shall look into the moral virtue of prudence (Phronesis) taking into cognizance its effect on individual happiness. Thereafter, we shall discuss the contemporary relevance of Aristotle’s idea of Phronesis. Definition of Virtue Aristotle in book I of his ethics lays a ground work for what is known as the “virtuous character.” He explains that all human actions are aimed at some end or some good. However, since there are many apparent ends, the only end that meets the criteria for completeness is happiness since it is always chosen for itself and never because of something else. Thus, the ultimate good, the highest good of humans is Eudaimonia which is translated to happiness; and he defines happiness as “an activity of the soul in accordance with virtue.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. I, Ch. 9, 1099 b21-1100a9. Happiness is acquired by virtue and it requires both complete virtue and complete life. According to Aristotle, “virtue then is a settled disposition of the mind determining the choice of actions and emotions, consisting essentially in the observance of the mean relative to us, this being determined by principle, that is as the prudent man would determine it.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. II, Ch. 6, 1106b24-1107a21. Thus, virtue is a state of the soul from which choice of action emanates. It is a trained faculty or habit of choice; a trained behavioral disposition that results in habitual acts of moral goodness. With this definition and by the statement “virtue… consisting essentially in the observance of the mean”; Aristotle invariably hinges the understanding and practice of virtue to the understanding of the ‘mean.’ Hence, the doctrine of the mean presupposes that an excellence of character is a state often flanked by two vices, one of excess and one of defect, that is, of too much and too little. He asserts that “excess and deficiency are a mark of vice, and observance of the mean, a mark of virtue.” Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. II, Ch. 6, 1106b24-1107a21. The concept of the mean presents an idea of a standard choice that each moral agent has to refer to since the ‘mean’ shows the true nature of virtue and how virtue is practiced. Cf. Jude O. Mbukanma, Moral Education in Aristotle (Ibadan: Newborne Enterprise, 2000), p. 73. The mean is determined by a rational principle and by that which a prudent man uses to determine it. Thus, he makes a necessary link between the mean and the virtue of prudence (Phronesis). Phronesis (Practical Wisdom) Phronesis is said to be the first or chief among the moral virtues; since it is often considered as practical wisdom, concerned about making right judgments about things to be done. Little wonder Aristotle begins his discourse on Phronesis by presenting the idea of Phronimos, that is, the person of practical wisdom. He posits that “we may grasp the nature of prudence if we consider what sort of people we call prudent.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. VI, Ch.5, 1104a24-b12. Hence, he presents a prudent man in these words: So it seems a feature of the prudent man to be able to deliberate nobly about things good and useful for himself, not in some partial way, as about what is good for health or strength, but about what is good for living well as a whole. A sign is that we call those prudent about a thing when they calculate well in view of an end of which there is no art. So, on the whole, he who has ability to deliberate would be prudent. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. VI, Ch.5, 1104a24-b12. Having said this, Aristotle defines phronesis as “the capacity of deliberating well about what is good and advantageous for oneself” and this is not just in partial sense, but regarding what sort of thing contributes to the good life in general. Thus, a phronetically-wise person is presented as one who is good at grasping the nature of the good (that is, the end itself). In addition, he considers practical wisdom as a rational faculty exercised for the attainment of truth, in things that are humanly good or bad. Hence, phronesis also points to deliberation about the means to the good rather than the end (good) itself, that is, “moral virtue makes us aim at the right target, and practical wisdom makes us use the right means.” This points to the fact that true moral virtue involves hitting the right target, not just accidentally or for some other reason, but for the right reasons, that is, by deliberating about the right means. Commenting on this, Theodore Tracy posits that, “the activity of the practical or calculative faculty is to deliberate on the concrete and changing, with a view to acting or producing, pursuing or avoiding.” Theodore J. Tracy, Physiological Theory and the Doctrine of the Mean in Plato and Aristotle (Paris: Mouton & Co. N.V., Publishers, 1969), p. 263. Thus, moral virtue has been seen as a disposition to choose and “choice is deliberate appetition” (desire). Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. IV, Ch.2, 1139a16-b2. Hence, Aristotle considers phronesis as the virtue which enables one to grasp the ends of actions as well as deliberate well about the means to arriving at such ends. Furthermore, Aristotle considers an intimate link between phronesis and moral virtues in such a way that none can be conceived without the other. For him, “virtue ensures the correctness of the end at which we aim and phronesis ensures the correctness of the means (best suited means) towards it.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. VI, Ch. 12, 1144a3-24. So, for an action to be morally right what is required for the rightness of the end and rightness of the means to that end is a kind of a goodness of character and phronesis respectively. This is because the phronimos who defines the ‘mean’ also acts according to the ‘mean’ and since to act according to the ‘mean’ is virtuous; it implies that the phronimos who necessarily acts according to the ‘mean’ must always be virtuous. Cf. Anthony Kenny, The Aristotelian Ethics: A Study of the Relationship Between the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978), p. 184. In fact, such person is capable of acting and doing what is best for himself or herself and for others. Thus, practical wisdom and moral weakness (akrasia) are incompatible. With this, Aristotle finds the consummation of all the moral virtues in phronesis. Therefore, moral virtues, right reason and its standard cannot be found outside the limits set by the phronimos. Phronesis and Individual Happiness Making right decisions in life practical situations is not always easy as we expect. This is because the decisions we make determine our individual happiness. Since, happiness is that which every human person desires and is the goal of every human action, we must discern the good and aim towards it. In doing this, prudence, the chief among the moral virtues, is an essential aid, as it counsels, judges and command with the sole aim of determining the mean in every practical decision. Aristotle asserts that moral virtues consist in the habit of always choosing the golden mean between two extremes, directed thereto by the intellectual virtue of prudence or practical wisdom. He notes that moral virtue is “… a quality disposing us to act in the best way when we are dealing with pleasure and pain, while vice is one which leads us to act in the worst way when we deal with them.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. II, Ch. 3, 1104b20-1105a9. For him, to act in the best way is simply to act in accordance with reason. Hence, it is necessary to have the right disposition to the right things and for the right actions. Furthermore, Aristotle insists that moral excellences which bring about individual happiness are necessarily built up by repetition of individual acts as in acquiring art: “we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts…” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. II, Ch. 1, 1103a14-1103b1. Notably, habituation is the process through which one receives the constant disposition to act virtuously. Aristotle continues by stating that moral excellences are not born with humans nor are they developed by nature, but are rather “adapted by nature to receive them and are brought to perfection by habituation.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. II, Ch. 1, 1103a14-b1. It is only by behaving in the right way, that we train ourselves to be virtuous. Similarly, moral evil or vice develops in the same way, by habituation, for one is said to be vicious, if the person has a consistent and persistent disposition to act viciously, that is, missing the ‘mean’ and inclining always either to the excess or defect of a particular action or emotion. Consequently, he proposes three criteria for making a distinction between acting virtuously (by accident) and being virtuous: the person must know that he or she is doing virtuous actions, that is, proper knowledge he or she intends to act virtuously for its own sake, that is, it is chosen deliberately he or she does the actions from a well-established habit, firm and certain disposition Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. II, 1105 a, 30. Given the criteria above, we can argue that there is an intimate link between phronesis and individual happiness. For Aristotle, “virtue ensures the correctness of the end (happiness) at which we aim and phronesis ensures the correctness of the means (best suited means) towards it.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. VI, Ch. 12, 1144a3-24. Thus, phronesis is the ability to choose and act wisely based on an accurate perception of reality which is based on a habitual exercise of virtue. Cf. Patricia Lamoureux, The Great Virtues (Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 2004), p. 125. This brings about individual happiness. Contemporary Relevance of Aristotle’s Idea of Phronesis Phronesis enable humans, in the light of their conception of the good life in general, to perceive what charity requires of them, or more generally, what virtue requires of them in the particular case, and it motivates them to act accordingly. Thus, Phronesis will save a person from giving too much or too little through the doctrine of the mean; or even to the wrong causes, in particular instances (where the act of charity is concerned). Due to the consistent moral propriety of their actions, the Phronimos who is the particular individual who possesses and acts upon the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom, Cf. Whitney J. Oates, Aristotle and the Problem of Value (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 285. becomes an epitome of moral conduct so that those who lack virtues look up to him in order to act rightly. It is the practical wisdom that enables one to make a virtuous choice. Phronesis is also relevant in the families. It has to do with right administration or proper direction and ordering of the affairs of a family. The moral agent due to his or her inestimable moral worth, coupled with his or her rich repertoire of experience in life is able to order the moral lives of the members of his household. Moreover, phronesis provide to political leaders, the rightful management of the affairs of the state. By virtue of the moral agent’s ability to deliberate well and to marshal the right means to their appropriate end, the leader is able to regulate the conduct of the people through good laws and their executions. Hence, Aristotle posits that “the best man is not he who exercises his virtue towards himself, but he who exercises it towards another.” Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. VI, Ch. 6, 1134a23-b8. When virtuous leaders are elected and good policies are made, it positively affects the citizens. Since it is the individuals that make up the society, it is impossible to have a bad society if they are phronimos. Conclusion Our aim from the beginning of this paper was to do an analysis of Aristotle’s concept of Phronesis and individual happiness. We presented Aristotle’s conception of virtue where he asserts that virtue is a state of the soul from which choice of action emanates through the observance of the mean. Then, we looked into the virtue of Phronesis taking into cognizance individual happiness. Thereafter, we considered the contemporary relevance of Aristotle’s idea of Phronesis. From the foregoing, we have learned that living a life of virtue guided by phronesis, not just exteriorly, but with a right disposition from the interior, will lead to individual happiness and to a better society in general. Hence, it is vital that we think about situations in terms of virtues. If we think of actions as expressions of virtue, this could be very helpful practically. Thus, we can simply state that in the light of Aristotle’s concept of virtue, contemporary society may never find happiness until it begins to seek virtue and phronesis, rather than vice and deception. BIBLIOGRAPHY Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. Transl. by Harris Rackman. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999. Kenny, Anthony. The Aristotelian Ethics: A Study of the Relationship Between the Eudemian and Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978. Lamoureux, Patricia. The Great Virtues. Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa, 2004. MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984. Mbukanma, Jude. Moral Education In Aristotle. Ibadan: Newborne Enterprise, 2000. Oates, J. Whitney. Aristotle and the Problem of Value. New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963. Tracy, J. Theodore. Physiological Theory and the Doctrine of the Mean in Plato and Aristotle. Paris: Mouton & Co. N.V., Publishers, 1969. 6