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The Resilience of K-Pop Popularity despite Anti-Korean Sentiments in China and Japan

반한 감정에도 불구하고 지속되는 케이팝의 인기:

중국과 일본을 중심으로

2021년 2월

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Abstract

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The Korean Wave has been a significant source of cultural soft power by winning the hearts of the foreign public. *Hallyu* has been most popular in China and Japan, with exports to these countries accounting for more than half of the total net exports of South Korean cultural content. However, anti-Korean sentiments are remarkably high in both China and Japan due to political, diplomatic, and historical conflicts. Anti-Korean sentiment has negatively influenced the sustainability of *hallyu*, as the export of dramas and movies has decreased. Nonetheless, despite anti-Korean sentiment, the popularity of K-pop continued to increase. Along with relative apoliticism, the core reason for this lies in the sense of "connectedness." The nature of the music itself bonds listeners regardless of national borders. Technological development bypassed government control and improved access and connections between K-pop suppliers and consumers. The main supplier, the

Korean entertainment industry, strategically managed K-pop with glocal familiarity and interactivity. Furthermore, the digital generation consumers joined together in participatory fandoms to share their collective interests. Altogether, these factors strengthened the connectedness of K-pop, which helped to sustain its popularity in Northeast Asia despite anti-Korean sentiment.

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Abbreviations

BATH   Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, and Huawei

CCTV   China Central Television

EEZ   Exclusive Economic Zone

GAFA   Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon

GSOMIA General Security of Military Information

IP   Intellectual Properties

ITU   International Telecommunication Union

K-POP   Korean Popular Music

KF   Korea Foundation

KOCCA   Korea Creative Content Agency

KOFICE Korean Foundation for International Cultural Exchange

KOSTAT Statistics Korea

KWSI   Korean Wave Status Index

KWSCI   Korean Wave Consumer Survey Index

MCST   Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism

MOFA   Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MOJ   Ministry of Justice

MOU   Memorandum of Understanding

NHK   Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai

OST   Original Sound Track

OTT	Over-The-Top
PPL	Product Placement
R&B	Rhythm and Blues
ROK	Republic of Korea
SARFT	State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television
SNS	Social Networking Sites
SPT	Social Presence Theory
THAAD	Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
TV	Television
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

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Chapter I. Introduction

Hallyu (aka the Korean Wave) has been an extraordinary sociocultural phenomenon since the late 20th century, spreading across East Asia towards the whole world. The term "*hallyu*" refers to the popularity of South Korean popular culture (윤태진 외, 2019). *Hallyu* is mainly considered to be music (K-pop), dramas, and movies according to the Korean Foundation for International Cultural Exchange (KOFICE)'s annual survey conducted since 2012.[1] In International Studies, *hallyu* is researched as a major source of South Korea's soft power,[2] as it has won the hearts of the foreign public (김유경·이효복, 2018; 유상철 외, 2005).

In fact, according to KOFICE's annual survey, South Korea's image has been mostly associated with *hallyu* content such as "K-pop" and "Korean food," which surpassed other key determinants such as the "IT industry" or "North Korea" (2012-2020).[3] Thus, the Korean Wave has played a significant role as a source of South Korea's cultural soft power by expanding the Republic of Korea (ROK)'s

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[1] For details on the survey, refer to "**< Appendix 1 >** *Hallyu* Content."

[2] Referring to Joseph Nye, soft power is a state's ability to voluntarily attract prefer able outcomes from other states through the use of soft power resources, such as culture, music, art, sports, diplomacy, etc. (2004).

[3] For details on the survey, refer to "**< Appendix 2 >** South Korean Images (Top 2)."

cultural leverage at the global level through national branding,[4] generating

economic profits,[5] and improving diplomatic relations[6] (김유경·이효복, 2018).

Due to a spill-over effect, foreign *hallyu* consumers are further attracted to Korean

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[4] Nation branding is used to construct a positive image and enhance the value and dignity of a country (Dinnie, 2016; Lee, 2010).

< Perception change of South Korea after experiencing Korean cultural content >

	Positive	Neutral	Negative
2017.11 (n=7,800)	60.4	34.3	5.3
2018.11 (n=7,500)	62.3	32.9	4.8
2019.09 (n=8,000)	62.1	33.4	4.5

*No significant difference between sex (men/women)

**Slight difference based on age with the largest perception change among the 20s and 30s.

According to KOFICE's annual survey (2018-2020) on the overseas status of *hallyu*, approximately 60% of users responded that their perception of South Korea has positively changed after experiencing Korean cultural content.

[5] ROK's cultural content exports have been rapidly increasing since the 2000s. Over the course of 2017, ROK's cultural content exports increased 14.7% to $6.89 billion USD, and ROK's cultural content sales increased 4.8% to ₩110.5 trillion KRW. During the same period, the overall annual growth rate for domestic product exports in 2017 was lower, at only 3.1%. Likewise, from 2012 to 2016, sales of cultural content rose 4.9% each year, which is comparable to the 1.5% annual growth rate of total industry sales during the same five year period. The remarkable achievement of the cultural industry is comparable to the overall trends in South Korean economy, which can be attributed to the positive effects of the Korean Wave (김유경·이효복, 2018).

[6] Public diplomacy is categorized under soft power, which combines culture and diplomacy as national power (Kim, 2017).

culture. *Hallyu* has also alleviated the "Korea discount,"[7] stimulated foreign consumption of Korean goods and services, revitalized tourism, and encouraged exchange students and foreigners to learn Korean[8] (유성만, 2019; 정정주, 2018; 한충민, 2017).

Nonetheless, anti-Korean sentiment along with anti-*hallyu* movements, have also become an important issue since the mid-2000s, particularly in Northeast Asia. China and Japan, where the *hallyu* boom initially began, are consistently the top two importers of South Korean cultural content, accounting for more than half of total net sales.[9] Nevertheless, anti-Korean sentiment, which stems from diplomatic, historical, political, and cultural conflicts, is also the strongest in China and Japan (김종법, 2015; 조소영, 2019). Consequently, these anti-Korean sentiments further influence anti-*hallyu* trends (Kim et al., 2014). As noted in KOFICE's annual survey, China and Japan's core reason for anti-*hallyu* movements is political and

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[7] "'Korea discount' is the amount by which investors undervalue Korean stocks (Salmon 2007)" due to the relatively low status of South Korea's nation brand (Schmuck, 2011).

[8] < TOPIK Applicants >

	TOPIK I	TOPIK II	Total
2015	58,614	148,164	206,778
2016	68,644	181,497	250,141
2017	79,802	210,836	290,638
2018	88,384	240,840	329,224
2019	101,617	274,254	375,871

The number of foreigners applying for the Korean Language Proficiency Test has in creased from 206,778 in 2015 to 375,871 in 2019 (TOPIK, 2020).

[9] Refer to "Chapter II. The Ups and Downs of the Korean Wave."

historical conflicts.[10] This is in contrast to the core reason in other countries, which is excessive commercialization (2014-2020). Recently, anti-Korean sentiments in Northeast Asia have heightened due to intensifying nationalism, which is openly expressed and ruthlessly spread online (김은준·김수정, 2016). In China, the ROK's deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and in Japan, the ROK Supreme Court's verdict regarding former victims of forced labor and the attempted termination of the General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) have escalated diplomatic tensions and anti-Korean sentiment (조소영, 2019). This has further worsened anti-*hallyu* feelings in China and Japan, according to the KOFICE's annual survey (2014-2020).[11] Scholars have

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[10] < Top Reasons for Anti-*Hallyu* >

	China	Japan
2014	Political/Historical conflicts (70%)	South Korea's critical stance towards Japan (91.8%)
2015	Too commercial (75%)	South Korea's critical stance towards Japan (89.1%)
2016	Protect China's content industry (70.2%)	South Korea's critical stance towards Japan (89.2%)
2017	Political/Historical conflicts (29.9%)	Political/Historical conflicts (26.5%)
2018	Political/Historical conflicts (17.8%)	Political/Historical conflicts (20.3%)
2019	Too commercial (32%)	Political/Historical conflicts (23.5%)
2020	Too commercial (35.7%)	Political/Historical conflicts (30.1%)

* 2014-2016: multiple response / 2017-2020: singular response

[11] < Anti-*Hallyu* Sentiment in Northeast Asia (KOFICE, 2014-2020) >

	China	Japan
2014	17.5	21.3
2015	19	23
2016	19	23

questioned the persistence of *hallyu* and whether it is a "sustainable culture" or a "transient culture" (Chae et.al, 2020). Jun (전종근) and Kim (김승년) analyzed the growth/decline of *hallyu* by formulating indices and found that *hallyu* is stagnating in both China and Japan (2014-2019).[12] However, many of the studies that argue that *hallyu* is waning or is a fad were frequently conducted when anti-Korean sentiment was high and overlook the long-term trend. Therefore, this research uses quantitative data from KOSTAT (Statistics Korea) on exports of South Korean cultural content to China and Japan from 2000 to 2018 and KOFICE's qualitative annual survey on the status of *hallyu* overseas from 2012 to 2020 to conduct a comparative case study between China and Japan.

Despite strong anti-Korean sentiment and pessimistic views toward the Korean Wave, the popularity of K-pop has continued to grow in both China and Japan. In fact, South Korean music content exports to China steadily increased from $557 thousand USD in 2002 to $3.627 million USD in 2010, reaching $111.962 million USD in 2018 (KOSTAT, 2020).[13] Similarly, South Korean music content exports to Japan steadily increased from $2.246 million USD in 2002 to

2017	27.8	28.3
2018	49.4	23.6
2019	25.6	29.8
2020	31.4	31.2

[12] Refer to "**< Appendix 3 >** KWSI & KWSCI" for details on the indices.

China and Japan are both in the "diffusion phase" according to the "Korean Wave Status Index." Based on the "Korean Wave Consumer Survey Index," China is categorized in the "intermediate *Hallyu* growth" group while Japan is in the "declining *Hallyu*" group.

[13] Refer to "**< Graph 1 >** *Hallyu* Content Exports to China (2000-2018)."

$67.267 million USD in 2010, reaching $367.335 million USD in 2018 (KOSTAT, 2020).[14] The popularity of K-pop has been resilient in both China and Japan compared to other categories of *hallyu* content, which fluctuated depending on anti-Korean sentiment. Therefore, this research addresses the question of why K-pop's popularity has continued to grow despite anti-Korean sentiments in China and Japan. Interestingly, China and Japan are the top two consumers of K-pop and other South Korean cultural content, but, at the same time, they are the countries that display the strongest anti-Korean sentiments. Though other categories of *hallyu* content were vulnerable to anti-Korean sentiment, music has been resilient. Thus, this paper explores the reasons behind the intriguingly consistent popularity of K-pop.

Previous literature on the popularity of K-pop in China and Japan focuses on Asian values and cultural proximity to explain its success. Sun and Liew argue that K-pop was able to flourish in China due to the K-pop stars' similarity in appearance to fellow Asians as well as their humble and well-mannered attitudes based on the Confucian culture (2019). Additionally, Yoon (윤경우, 2006) and Choi (최정봉, 2014) point out that China willingly accepted South Korean cultural content because they resembled Chinese traditional values, but also mixed with modernized western features. As such, *hallyu* was perceived as a filter for the dominant American popular culture. Moreover, Iwabuchi and Chua explore the cultural and social similarities in terms of traditions and experiences during the rapid modernization period among South Korea and other Asian countries

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[14] Refer to "**< Graph 2 >** *Hallyu* Content Exports to Japan (2000-2018)."

including Japan (2008). Kim (김두진) further contends that the positive reputation of K-pop should be attributed to regionalization and "Asianization," as K-pop is a product of Asian hybridity (2018). However, previous research on cultural proximity and Asian hybridity fails to explain the recent global expansion of K-pop in non-Asian countries.

Other research, mostly from South Korean scholars, argues that the Korean entertainment industry's strategic management resulted in the success of K-pop. Ko (고정민) analyzed the competitiveness of *hallyu* using Michael Porter's diamond model and referred to the excellence of K-pop content (2005) as well as the Korean entertainment industry's business strategies, such as localization, niche marketing, convergence, social media, catch-up, voluntary fan communities, leadership, story-telling, and systematic training as the key to K-pop's success (2016). Lim (임성준) highlights other strategies used to enter the global market, such as the "born global mix of talent development and acquisition strategy," "360⁰ management and star business system," as well as the "freeconomics model" (2013). Kim (김종호) and Kim (김필수) also point out the attractiveness of K-pop stars (2015). However, studies that focus only on the South Korean entertainment industry overlook the perspectives of actual K-pop consumers.

Recent studies on the global success of K-pop underlines technology and fandom as the keys to its success. Cho (조병철) and Shim (심희철) focus on the importance of smart media, especially the role of social media, which has

contributed to the global expansion of K-pop (2013). Song applied the Web2 theory to global online distribution strategies and analyzed the impact of social media on crowdsourcing, copyleft, and the socio-economic environment for the production and online distribution of K-pop (2015). Furthermore, Yoon (윤여광) analyzed the global success of K-pop using the SMCRE model, focusing on the leverage effect of fandoms as public diplomats (2019). Lee (이지행) also addressed fandom activities and their influence on the global expansion of K-pop (2019). However, these recent studies do not sufficiently explain the continuing popularity of K-pop despite anti-Korean sentiments in the specific region of Northeast Asia.

Therefore, this research paper stresses a sense of "connectedness" as the underlying reason for the popularity of K-pop in China and Japan despite anti-Korean sentiment. Though anti-Korean sentiment stem from political, diplomatic, and historical conflicts, one factor that makes the popularity of K-pop resilient is its relative apoliticism. K-pop, as music, is considered to be a form of culture and art, and, therefore, relatively detached from politics. On the supply side, the success of K-pop was mainly led by the private sector. The South Korean government's *hallyu* policies were largely ineffective until it started to collaborate with the private sector using a bottom-up approach. On the demand side, the channels through which consumers access K-pop are difficult for governments to regulate and are prone to piracy. Also, consumers consider K-pop to be a sub-culture and one of many leisure activities. Nonetheless, K-pop is still influenced by politics because it is employed as a form of soft power diplomacy by South Korea and it confronts anti-Korean sentiment due to extreme nationalism. Therefore, explaining the

popularity of K-pop despite anti-Korean sentiment as solely based on its relative apoliticism is insufficient. Hence, this research contends that connectedness, affinity, and the strong solidarity created by K-pop are the core reasons for the resilient popularity of K-pop in China and Japan despite strong anti-Korean sentiment. Music creates a sense of understanding, and technology connects people across space and time. The suppliers, which are mainly led by the South Korean entertainment companies, utilized "glocal" (global+local) strategies to encourage the stars and fans to interact. The digital generation consumers constructed a collective identity and built solidarity through fandoms. As shown in < Figure 1 >, these four variables interacted and formed a strong belongingness of "us" which enabled K-pop to remain resilient despite anti-Korean sentiment. Hence, K-pop in China and Japan sustained its popularity through this sense of "connectedness."

< Figure 1 > K-pop Connectedness

Chapter II. The Ups and Downs of the Korean Wave

1. China

1-1. Ups: The Korean Wave (韩流)

China has been the largest importer of aggregated South Korean cultural content since 2015, and is currently the second largest importer of *hallyu* content, specifically K-pop (KOSTAT, 2000-2018).[15]

< Table 1 > The Popularity of *Hallyu* in China

1997	What is Love (사랑이 뭐길래)	4.3% viewer ratings
2002	Autumn in my heart (가을동화)	Aired on 21 television channels
2005	A Jewel in the Palace (대장금)	Daejangguem fever (大长今热潮)
2013	G-dragon	Youku Todou Young Choice Awards
	EXO	Baidu Entertainment Hot Point Awards
	Super Junior	V Chart Awards (2 awards)
		Baidu Entertainment Hot Point Awards
	The Heirs (상속자들)	3.2 billion online views
	My Love From the Star (별에서 온 그대)	5.2 billion online views
2014	EXO	V Chart Awards

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[15] Refer to "< **Appendix 4** > South Korean Cultural Content Exports to China (2000-2018)" for details.

		Gaon Weibo Chart
		China Mobile Music Awards
	BTS	V Chart Awards
	Super Junior	V Chart Awards (2 awards)
	G-dragon	QQ Music Awards
	Rain	QQ Music Awards
2015	PSY	QQ Music Awards
	Winner	QQ Music Awards
	Epik High	V Chart Awards
2016	BIGBANG	QQ Music Awards (3 awards)
	G-dragon	QQ Music Awards
	iKON	QQ Music Awards (2 awards)
	EXO	V Chart Awards
	Descendants of the Sun (태양의 후예)	3.2 billion online views
2017	BTS	V Chart Awards
	EXO	V Chart Awards (6 awards)
	NCT	V Chart Awards (3 awards)
2019	Blackpink	Tencent Music Awards
	EXO	Tencent Music Awards

South Korea and China began political, economic, and cultural exchanges in 1992 with the establishment of ROK-China diplomatic relations after the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping declared "reform and opening in the South" (南巡讲话). This led the Chinese government to begin actively importing foreign cultural content (리우리리, 2019). When domestic content was lacking and products from western and democratic countries were strictly regulated, inexpensive but high-quality South Korean cultural content satisfied the needs of Chinese consumers, who were stuck between socialist values and capitalist modernization (윤경우,

2006; 최정봉, 2014). For example, in 1997, the drama *What is Love (사랑이 뭐길래)* was initially broadcast on China Central Television (中国中央电视台) Channel 1 and was later televised again due to viewer demand in 1998 on CCTV Channel 2 during prime time. It achieved 4.3% viewer ratings, which was the second highest ever among imported foreign dramas (Jang, 2012). Due to the popularity of South Korean content, the term "*hallyu*" was first introduced in 1999 by the Chinese Communist Party's media outlet, the *China Youth Daily (北京青年報)*. Additionally, K-pop was so favored by Chinese youth that in 2000, H.O.T.'s concert in Beijing became the first live concert by a foreign music group to sell out (Kim J., 2016). In fact, according to a poll from *Modern Music Field (当代歌坛)* in 2000, H.O.T. ranked 2nd out of the "top ten coolest idols (十大最酷偶像投票揭榜)," while all the other celebrities on the list were Chinese stars from Taiwan and Hong Kong (Sun and Liew, 2019). In the mid-2000s, the popularity of Korean dramas reached its peak. According to CSM(中国广视索福瑞媒介研究), in 2004, Korean dramas ranked from 1st to 6th place on the "national ratings of CCTV foreign dramas," and in 2005, Korean dramas ranked from 1st to 10th place on "average ratings of Asian dramas" (강내영, 2008). One example is *A Jewel in the Palace (대장금)*, which was aired on Hunan Television (湖南卫视) starting from 2005. The drama was widely viewed across China by people of all ages and genders, pushing the drama's ratings over 14% and

making it the most viewed drama in China during its time slot (Jang, 2012; 박승록,

2008). However, after the "Daejangguem fever (大长今热潮)," South Korean

dramas faced harsh criticism from China due to historical controversies regarding

the contents of the drama.

Nonetheless, as shown in < Table 1 >, Chinese interest in K-pop idols, such as

BIGBANG, EXO, Super Junior, etc. persisted. K-pop stars have continuously been

nominated for the V Chart Awards, which is one of the largest music awards

ceremonies in China held by the major music site YinYueTai (音悦Tai). K-pop

stars also continued to hold concerts in large cities throughout China and contact

with fans. Chinese fans could also access K-pop content and handily connect with

idols online with the advancement of video platforms, such as PPTV, Youku (优酷),

Tudou (土豆网), iQIYI (愛奇藝), etc., even though K-pop artists did not release

albums or debut in China. In fact, Korean fanatics and enthusiastic K-pop fans,

known as Hanmi (韓迷) and Hāhánzú (哈韩族), has become an issue in Chinese

society that has been covered by the media. The popularity of K-pop stars spilled

over into lifestyle, fashion, and beauty to the point that Korea has become a

buzzword for the fashionable and stylish. Chinese fans have been imitating K-pop

idols' fashion, makeup, hairstyles, etc., which resulted in increasing plastic surgery

tourism in Korea (Jang, 2012). Moreover, popular South Korean variety show

formats have been exported to China. For instance, in 2013, Hunan Television

(湖南卫视) bought the rights for *I am a Singer (나는 가수다)* from MBC and

produced a Chinese version of the show. As variety shows gained popularity, more Korean variety show formats, such as *Daddy Where are You Going (아빠 어디가)*, *Running Man (런닝맨)* and *Infinite Challenge (무한도전)* were adopted in China (왕쉬에, 2016). In 2014, the Korean drama *My Love from the Star (별에서 온 그대)*, which was aired on the video site iQIYI instead of being broadcast on television due to strict regulations, achieved massive popularity. Moreover, in 2016, *Descendants of the Sun (태양의 후예)* was pre-produced and aired by both KBS and iQIYI. With the popularity of *hallyu* content, Chinese companies increasingly showed interest in PPL, which led to South Korea-China joint productions, recruitment of Korean production workers, investment and acquisition of Korean production companies, etc. (손성욱, 2019; 정수영 외, 2018). Nonetheless, after South Korea deployed THAAD, South Korean cultural content faced harsh backlash due to the Chinese government imposing a ban on *hallyu*.

1-2. Downs: Anti-Korean Sentiment (反韓)

The causes of anti-Korean sentiment in China are complex, and involve various elements such as history, politics, economy, diplomacy, and culture that cause negative images of South Korea (신영미, 2011).

<< **Table 2** > ROK-China Conflicts & Anti-Korean Incidents

2000	Korea-China garlic dispute
2002	Northeast Project (동북공정)
2003	Goguryeo
2005	Gangneung Dano Festival - UNESCO
2006	Donguibogam (동의보감) - UNESCO
2007	Baekdu Mountain
2008	Torch relay violence during Beijing Olympics
2008	Sichuan(四川) earthquake vicious online comments
2012	East China Sea EEZ
2013	Hanoryeong (限娛令)
2015	Hanoelyeong (限外令)
	Hanjinryeong (限真令)
2016	Handongnyeong(限童令)
2016	THAAD
2017	Hanhanryeong(限韓令)

Anti-*hallyu* and anti-Korean sentiments largely broke out in the mid-2000s due to the Chinese popular culture industry's concerns over the overwhelming flow of Korean cultural content into China. The excessive commercialization and unilateral over-supply of *hallyu* caused animosity in China[16] (김은준·김수정, 2016; 황낙건, 2014). In 2005, the *People's Daily (人民日報)* quoted the CEO of

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[16] In fact, on December 10, 2013, the *People's Daily (人民日報)*, which is a newspaper funded by the Chinese government, published an essay, "'*Hallyu*' and 'Anti-*Hallyu*' ("韩流"与"嫌韩流")." The essay criticized *hallyu*, which was unilateral and commercial, disregarding the culture of other countries and only emphasizing South Korea's cultural influence (손성욱, 2013).

Phoenix Satellite Television (鳳凰衛視), Liu Changle (刘长乐), who said that "it is

a shame that China has been swayed by the Korean Wave for seven years."

Moreover, according to a survey mentioned by the *China Youth Daily (中國靑年*

報), *A Jewel in the Palace* was chosen as "the drama Chinese hate the most" (강내

영, 2008). Chinese actor and film director Guoli Zhang (張國立) also condemned *A*

Jewel in the Palace for cultural theft. He claimed that it distorted the cultural

heritage of acupuncture, which should be Chinese, not Korean. This further spurred

cultural nationalism among Chinese netizens (Leung, 2008). Anti-Korean

sentiment was disseminated throughout the internet and to the public over

controversies surrounding the historical distortion in Korean dramas. Antagonism

against South Korea intensified in China due to these historical and cultural clashes,

and the misunderstanding that South Korea was infringing on Chinese culture and

pride due to similar Confucius traditions in both China and Korea (김종법 2015;

김은준·김수정, 2016; 유보전, 2014). "Internet nationalism" has further

aggravated anti-Korean sentiment in China, as internet discourse concentrates on

foreign rather than domestic issues. This is because Chinese netizens are only

allowed to discuss sensitive issues when they do not challenge the Chinese

government and system (Chen, 2017; 신영미, 2011; 허진 외, 2013).

Moreover, as shown in < Table 2 >, political and diplomatic conflicts between

South Korea and China further strengthened anti-Korean sentiment (김은준·김수

정, 2016). The Chinese government has propagated an "imagined nation (想像的共

同體)," which consolidates and controls all 55 ethnic minorities and the Han

majority as one nation. However, as the Chinese government incorporated ethnic

minorities' history and traditions into the imagined cultural community, diplomatic

tensions over the roots of history and culture intensified (박정수, 2012). In 2002,

China launched a five-year academic project (2002-2007) called the "Northeast

Project (東北邊疆歷史與現狀系列研究工程)," focusing on the history, geography,

and ethnic issues in northeastern China. The Northeast Project was condemned by

Korea for distorting the ancient history of Gojoseon (고조선), Goguryeo (고구려),

and Balhae (발해). This spurred ongoing online disputes. Moreover, when South

Korea registered "Gangneung Dano Festival (강릉 단오제)" on the UNESCO

cultural heritage list in 2004, Chinese netizens criticized Korea and claimed that

the festival originated from China's "Duanwu Festival (端午節)." Furthermore,

diplomatic and political tensions over Chinese students' violence against South

Korean human rights protestors during the Beijing Olympics torch relay in 2008,

rights to the East China Sea's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in 2012, and so

forth have resulted in nationalistic animosity against South Korea. The underlying

cause of anti-Korean sentiment is the rise of "sinocentric nationalism (中華民族),"

which is characterized by "sinocentrism (中國中心主義)" and the "century of

humiliation (百年國恥)." China has a cultural pride that is based on the idea that China was the hegemon in East Asia for thousands of years (中國中心主義). Yet, China is also concerned about foreign aggression due to the 1840 Opium war, repeated invasions, imperialism, and ideological confrontations (百年國恥) (Chen, 2017; 박정수, 2012; 신영미, 2011).

Correspondingly, anti-Korean sentiment led the State Administration of Radio, Film, and Television (SARFT) to regulate the import of Korean cultural content. The Chinese government perceives the popularity of *hallyu* as an obstacle to achieving the "Chinese dream (中國夢)" by hampering China's cultural development and its re-emergence as the greatest cultural power (허진 외, 2013). In order to defend China's cultural security and economic interests and reinforce its soft power, the Chinese government implemented various cultural policies and manipulated them into becoming more anti-*hallyu* (류설리, 2017; 안인환, 2014; 이욱연, 2009). Then, as *hallyu* gained more popularity, the socialist Chinese government tightened its regulatory measures using SARFT to reduce dependency on foreign cultural content (강내영, 2008, 2012; 한은경 외, 2010). The Chinese government issued regulations, such as Hanoryeong (限娛令) [17] (2013),

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[17] The Hanoryeong (限娛令) regulation targets entertainment companies.

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Hanoelyeong (限外令) [18] (2015), Hanjinryeong (限真令) [19] (2015), Handongnyeong (限童令)[20] (2016), and Hanmoryeong (限模令)[21] (2016) so that Korean cultural content must pass through deliberation from SARFT to be broadcast on internet sites (2014), distributed online (2015), and uploaded on social media (2016) (권기영, 2012, 2015, 2017; 이건웅, 2018; 정수영 외, 2018). Furthermore, South Korea's deployment of THAAD in 2016 led to "Hanhanryeong (限韓令)," a government ban on *hallyu* (Hwang, 2018; 이루다, 2018). Surveys from Chinese media outlets showed strong anti-Korean sentiment following South Korea's deployment of THAAD. According to the *Global Times (环球时报)*, 88.3% of the Chinese public agreed that "sanctions should be imposed on South Korea for deploying THAAD." According to the *Beijing News (新京報)*, 87% of respondents agreed with Hanhanryeong, making remarks, such as "no idols in front of my country." The incident received a barrage of media attention ever since the establishment of 1992 ROK-China diplomatic ties. In fact, the Chinese Communist Party's newspaper, *People's Daily (人民日報)*, released 265 critical reports against

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[18] The Hanoelyeong (限外令) regulation targets dramas.

[19] The Hanjinryeong (限真令) regulation targets variety shows.

[20] The Handongnyeong (限童令) regulation targets children.

[21] The Hanmoryeong (限模令) regulation targets foreign formats.

South Korea's deployment of THAAD (장우애, 2017). Moreover, the stock prices of the four largest *hallyu* entertainment companies fell approximately ₩361.5 billion KRW in total in the third quarter of 2016, which is an average drop of 14 percent. The damage done by Hanhanryeong went beyond the entertainment sector, affecting the tourism and distribution industries as well, with direct and indirect losses ranging from ₩5.6 trillion KRW to ₩15.2 trillion KRW according to the Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism (김덕중 외, 2017; 김휘정, 2017).

1-3. Resilience of K-Pop

< Graph 1 > *Hallyu* Content Exports to China (2000-2018)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Music			557				850	1665	1844	2369	3,627	6,836	8,806	10,186	52,798	89,761	98,362	109,931	111,962
Movie	278		1862		206		1144	824	1306	1578	966	1,628	2,008	3,966	10,961	11,221	11,446	7,733	17,164
Broadcast	1042		4537		6724		12441	4752.7	8097	1103	20,954.	21,268.	13,162.	35,025	109,629	63,702	93,955	68,435	60,540

[Source] KOCCA (한국콘텐츠진흥원), KOSTAT (통계청), MCST (문화체육관광부-문화셈터)

Nevertheless, as presented in < Graph 1 >, exports of K-pop music to China continued to increase despite anti-Korean sentiment. On the other hand, exports of broadcasts, which include dramas, variety shows, etc., fluctuated due to anti-Korean sentiment. It is clear that broadcasts have been negatively affected by the historical controversies over the origins of the "Gangneung Dano Festival (강릉단오제)" in 2005 and the "Donguibogam: Principles and Practice of Eastern Medicine (동의보감)," an ancient Korean medical encyclopedia, in 2006. It is also clear that diplomatic and political concerns, such as the THAAD deployment in 2016, resulted in sharp decreases in broadcast and movie exports. However, music exports have remained resilient despite anti-Korean sentiment and continuous cultural, historical, diplomatic, and political conflicts between the two countries.

2. Japan

2-1. Ups: The Korean Wave (かんりゅう)

Japan was the largest importer of South Korean cultural content until 2014, and currently is the second largest importer. Japan has also consistently been the number one importer of *hallyu* content and K-pop (KOSTAT, 2000-2018)[22].

< **Table 3** > The Popularity of *Hallyu* in Japan

2000	Swiri (쉬리)	¥1.8 billion JPY
2002	BoA	Japan Record Awards
2003	BoA	Japan Gold Disc
		Japan Record Awards
2004	Winter Sonata (겨울연가)	Yonsama syndrome / 20.6%
	Stairway to Heaven (천국의 계단)	11.70%
	A Moment to Remember (내 머리 속에 지우개)	¥3 billion JPY
	BoA	Japan Gold Disc
		Japan Record Awards
2005	April Snow (외출)	¥2.8 billion JPY
	BoA	Japan Gold Disc
2006	BoA	Japan Gold Disc
		Japan Record Awards
2008	TVXQ	NHK Kōhaku Uta Gassen
2009	BIGBANG	Japan Record Awards (2 awards)
		Japan Cable Awards (2 awards)
		NTV Best Hits Kayosai
	TVXQ	NHK Kōhaku Uta Gassen
2010	BIGBANG	Japan Record Awards
		Japan Gold Disc

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[22] Refer to "< **Appendix 5** > South Korean Cultural Content Exports to Japan (2000-2018)" for details.

Year	Group	Award/Event
		MTV Video Music Awards Japan (3 awards)
	TVXQ	Tokyo Dome Tour
	SNSD	Japan Record Awards
	Kara	Japan Record Awards
2011	TVXQ	NHK Kōhaku Uta Gassen
		Japan Gold Disc (2 awards)
		Japan Record Awards
	Kara	NHK Kōhaku Uta Gassen
		Oricon
		Japan Gold Disc (2 awards)
		Japan Best Dresser
		Japan Record Awards
	SNSD	NHK Kōhaku Uta Gassen
		Japan Record Awards
2012	Kara	Japan Best Dresser
		Japan Gold Disc (5 awards)
	SNSD	MTV Video Music Awards Japan (2 awards)
		Japan Gold Disc (2 awards)
	TVXQ	TVXQ Dome Tour (550K)
		MTV Video Music Awards Japan
	BIGBANG	BIGBANG Dome Tour (450K)
2013	BIGBANG	Japan Gold Disc
		BIGBANG Dome Tour (771K)
		MTV Video Music Awards Japan
	TVXQ	TVXQ Dome Tour (700K)
	Kara	Japan Gold Disc (3 awards)
		MTV Video Music Awards Japan
	SNSD	Japan Gold Disc (2 awards)
2014	BIGBANG	BIGBANG Dome Tour (741K)
	TVXQ	Japan Gold Disc (5 awards)
		TVXQ Dome Tour (600K)
	SNSD	Japan Gold Disc (2 awards)
2015	BIGBANG	BIGBANG Dome Tour (911K)
	TVXQ	TVXQ Dome Tour (700K)
		Japan Gold Disc (5 awards)
	SNSD	Japan Gold Disc (2 awards)
	BTS	Japan Gold Disc (2 awards)
2016	BIGBANG	Concert No. 1 (1859K)
		Japan Record Awards
	EXO	Japan Gold Disc (2 awards)
	iKON	Japan Record Awards

2017	BIGBANG	Concert No. 2 (1022K)
		Japan Gold Disc (5 awards)
	BTS	Japan Gold Disc
	2PM	Japan Gold Disc
	iKON	Japan Gold Disc (2 awards)
	TWICE	Oricon Queen Awards
		NHK Kōhaku Uta Gassen
2018	BIGBANG	Japan Gold Disc (3 awards)
	Shinee	Japan Gold Disc
	TWICE	NHK Kōhaku Uta Gassen
		Japan Gold Disc (5 awards)
		Japan Record Awards
	Blackpink	MTV Video Music Awards Japan
2019	BTS	Japan Gold Disc (5 awards)
	TWICE	Oricon Queen Award
		NHK Kōhaku Uta Gassen
		Japan Gold Disc (2 awards)
	SEVENTEEN	Japan Gold Disc (2 awards)
2020	Parasite (기생충)	¥4.7 billion JPY
	Forced Landing of Love (사랑의 불시착)	Japan Netflix no. 1
	BTS	Japan Gold Disc (4 awards)
	TWICE	Japan Gold Disc (3 awards)
	IZ*ONE	Japan Gold Disc (2 awards)

Cultural and social exchanges between South Korea and Japan deepened after South Korea's democratization and the joint declaration announced by the South Korean president Kim Dae-Jung (김대중) and Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi (小渕 惠三) in October 1998. In 2002, South Korea and Japan co-hosted the FIFA World Cup and co-produced dramas, such as *Friends (프렌즈)*, *Passing Rain (소나기 비 갠 오후)*, *Stars Echo (별의 소리)*, and so forth. In this amicable atmosphere, the Korean Wave emerged in Japan after the drama *Winter Sonata*

(겨울연가) was televised on NHK satellite broadcast (BS) in 2003. It was later re-aired across Japan through NHK terrestrial broadcast due to its astounding popularity. *Winter Sonata* hit 20.6% viewer ratings, and the main actor Bae Yong-Joon sparked the "Yonsama (ヨン様)" syndrome—especially among middle-aged women (고정민 외, 2011). Historical dramas such as *A Jewel in the Palace (대장금)*, *Jumong (주몽)*, etc., gained popularity among middle-aged men as well. In fact, Tsutaya, a Japanese DVD rental company, stated that annual sales of Korean dramas hit their highest records in 2007 (정수영 외, 2018).

Drama OSTs drew attention to Korean popular music, and this interest further broadened to K-pop idols[23] (고정민 외, 2011). From the late-2000s, K-pop idol groups, such as BIGBANG, TVXQ, Kara, and SNSD gained huge popularity. From the late-2010s, TWICE and BTS became the most famous K-pop idols in Japan. In 2018, South Korea and Japan collaborated and debuted IZ*ONE through co-management by both South Korea's Stone Music and Swing Entertainment, and Japan's AKS (조규헌, 2018). Thanks to K-pop, *hallyu* fans broadened from middle-aged women to further include younger people in their teens, 20s, and 30s. South Korean idol groups became fashion-forward trendsetters whom the young Japanese strove to emulate. K-pop idols appealed to the Japanese youth with their professional images as hard-working singers and dancers, sophisticated features

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[23] For example, TVXQ participated in the OST for *The Legend (태왕사신기)* starring Bae Yong-Joon.

and stage manner, and fluent Japanese interview skills, which differentiated them from amateur Japanese idols (이시하라, 2011; 정수영, 2011).

As shown in < Table 3 >, K-pop musicians have won numerous awards at the Japan Gold Disc Awards (日本ゴールドディスク大賞) and the Japan Record Awards (日本レコード大賞), which are Japan's major music award shows. They have also performed at the NHK Kōhaku Uta Gassen (紅白歌合戦), which is Japan's most famous music festival. Moreover, BTS and BIGBANG's album sales amounted to over ¥2 billion JPY each (¥2.71 billion JPY and ¥2.08 billion JPY, respectively), and TWICE and TVXQ's album sales amounted to over ¥1 billion JPY each (¥1.82 billion JPY and ¥1.28 billion JPY, respectively), becoming top-selling albums in Japan (박성호·이광현, 2018). Furthermore, based on data from ACPC (コンサートプロモーターズ協会), K-pop artists hold the most performances and attract the largest audiences among foreign artists in Japan. The number of performances surpasses the total sum of those held by singers from other countries, including the Americas, Europe, Oceania, and so on. In fact, the number of K-pop concerts increased from 462 shows in 2012 to 919 shows in 2014. Also, the audiences are two to four times larger for K-pop artists than for other foreign musicians. In fact, the size of the audiences grew from 2.11 million people in 2012 to 5.75 million people in 2013. In 2016, BIGBANG attracted the largest audience ever with 1.859 million people, which surpassed the local Japanese musicians' concerts. Overall, K-pop concert-goers in Japan totaled 3.67 million

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people in 2017, which accounted for 53% of the audiences of foreign musician's concerts (정수영 외, 2018).

2-2. Downs: Anti-Korean Sentiment (けんかん)

Anti-Korean sentiment in Japan is led by extreme right-wing conservatives, and is based on racism and extreme nationalism. Anti-*hallyu* has been influenced by these far-right conservatives and is an alternative way to express hatred against Korea (김은준·김수정, 2016).

< **Table 4** > ROK-Japan Conflicts & Anti-Korean Incidents

2000	History distortion of "New History Textbook (新しい歴史教科書)"
2001	Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi's visit to Yasukuni Shrine (靖國神社)
2005	Japan's declaration of "Takeshima Day"
2005	Comic "Anti-*Hallyu* (マンガ 嫌韓流)"
2009	"Takeshima" on Japan's Defense White Paper
2011	Statue of Peace (Comfort Women statue)
2012	East Sea/Sea of Japan - International Hydrographic Organization
2012	ROK President Lee Myung Bak's Dokdo visit and remarks on Japanese Emperor's apology on colonization
2012	ROK Supreme Court verdict on Forced Labor
2013	Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's visit to Yasukuni Shrine

2014	Japanese historical textbook on Dokdo/Takeshima
2015	Sites of Japan's Meiji Industrial Revolution (Hashima) - UNESCO
2015	Comfort Women deal
2017	Statue of Peace (Comfort Women statue)
2018	ROK Supreme Court verdict on Forced Labor
2019	Japan's removal of ROK from trade "White List"
2019	Termination of GSOMIA

As demonstrated in < Table 4 >, anti-Korean sentiment increased during the mid-2000s as political, diplomatic, and historical disputes intensified between the two countries (손승혜, 2009). When Japan unilaterally declared "Takeshima Day" in 2005, ROK President Roh Moo-Hyun (노무현) took a hard stance against the Japanese government and suggested the possibility of a "diplomatic war." Territorial disputes over Dokdo/Takeshima further triggered far-right conservatives in Japan and exacerbated territorial disputes with China and Russia as well[24] (최희식, 2013). Anti-Korean discourse appeared in Japan on the internet text-board, 2channel (2ちゃんねる), and the comic "Anti-*Hallyu* (マンガ 嫌韓流)" became the number one best-seller on Amazon Japan in 2005 (정수영, 2010). Anti-Korean sentiment stems from Japanese perceptions of superiority and a contempt of Korea

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[24] Territorial dispute between China and Japan: Senkaku/Diaoyu islands

Territorial dispute between Japan and Russia: Kuril islands/Northern territories

that traces back to the colonial past (강기철, 2020). It is also due to the public's ignorance of South Korea and the facts surrounding historical events between the two countries (고경일, 2009; 박수옥, 2009).

Moreover, in August 2012, South Korean president Lee Myung-Bak (이명박) visited Dokdo and requested the Japanese emperor Akihito (明仁) to sincerely apologize for colonial atrocities. Japanese considered this as a taboo, and Korea-Japan relations worsened (나리카와 아야, 2020). The ongoing comfort women and forced labor issues further heightened diplomatic tensions, which intensified animosity and nationalism in the media, further contributing to anti-Korean sentiment. In fact, according to the Genron NPO and the East Asia Institute's public survey, the Japanese public's negative sentiment of South Korea is predominantly due to historical political tensions (52.1%), while positive perceptions are mainly attributed to Korean culture (49.5%) (2019). Also, according to the Japanese Cabinet Office's annual public survey, Japanese perceptions towards South Korea have been on a decline. The Japanese public's positive opinion of South Korea steadily increased from 1996 (35.8%) to 2011(62.2%), but nearly halved in 2012 (39.2%). Public opinion on South Korea has been on a steady decline, hitting the lowest rating—since the survey was first conducted in the late 1970s—in 2014 (31.5%). Similarly, the negative perception of South Korea notably hit over 50% starting from 2012. In addition, Japanese actor Sosuke Takaoka (高岡蒼佑) publically condemned the dominance of Korean

dramas in Japanese broadcastings, particularly on Fuji Television (フジテレビジョン), in 2011 (Kuwahara, 2014). This led to further boycotts of *hallyu* content (강준만, 2020). Since 2014, NHK and TBS ceased broadcasting Korean dramas because of concerns over advertisement withdrawals due to anti-Korean sentiment. Consequently, Korean dramas were replaced with American and British programs. Moreover, according to the *Asahi Shimbun (朝日新聞)*, *hallyu* related stores decreased by approximately 40% from 2012 to 2016 (안창현, 2017).

Furthermore, during Abe Shinzo's administration, Japanese far-right nationalists came to the fore. Since 2013, anti-Korean sentiment was led by the Japanese far-right association "Zaitokukai (在日特権を許さない市民の会)." [25] Discrimination and hate speech towards Korean residents in Japan by Zaitokukai have become serious social problems that have led the National Parliament of Japan to enact a law in 2016, calling for the elimination of "unfair discriminatory speech and behavior against persons originating from outside Japan" (MOJ, 2016). In fact, according to Japan's National Police Agency and Ministry of Justice, hate speech rallies decreased from 237 in 2012 and 190 in 2015 to 10 in 2019. However, anonymous hate speech on the internet has actually increased (윤설영, 2019). Recent escalation of anti-Korean sentiment is due to the rise of exclusive nationalism, the conservative swing, discrimination, racism, as well as the unstable

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[25] However, the majority of the Japanese public acknowledges that these extreme far-right movements are irrational and racist, and there are also campaigns against these extremists.

economic situation in Japan, which has led to national egoism (노윤선, 2016).

2-3. Resilience of K-Pop

< **Graph 2** > *Hallyu* Content Exports to Japan (2000-2018)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Music			2,246			801	14,309	9,431	11,215	21,638	67,267	157,938	189,512	221,739	235,481	242,370	277,292	320,599	367,335
Movie	5,279		6,582		40,401		10,385	5189	8,989	5,945	2,258	3,663	9,679	8,085	4,474	4,956	4,314	4,895	4,591
Broadcast	1,926		2,450		35,181	65,511	47,632.	53,494.	65,627.	65,279	49,712.	102,058	112,087	138,687	79,017	70,975	79,902	81,952	95,783

[Source] KOCCA (한국콘텐츠진흥원), KOSTAT (통계청), MCST (문화체육관광부-문화셈터)

Nonetheless, as in the case of China, the popularity of music continued to rapidly increase in Japan despite strong anti-Korean sentiment, as illustrated in < Graph 2 >. Whereas broadcasts and movies were more vulnerable to anti-Korean sentiment. Apparently, exports of broadcasts and movies sharply declined in the mid-2010s due to unending diplomatic, political, and historical conflicts regarding Dokdo/Takeshima, comfort women, forced laborers, and so on. Nevertheless, in comparison to other *hallyu* content, K-pop was remarkably resilient against strong anti-Korean sentiments in both China and Japan.

Chapter III. Relative Apoliticism?

1. K-Pop as Arts & Culture

One possible factor to explain the sustainability of K-pop is the relative apoliticism of music. K-pop music is accepted and consumed as a form of arts and culture, regardless of political relations (주영하, 2007). K-pop consumers tend to be attracted to the content itself rather than thinking about the nation of "Korea" (조병철·심희철, 2013). Moreover, Choi argues that *hallyu* fans are generally youth and women and are classified as minorities that are indifferent to politics (최정봉, 2014). Furthermore, under the "beast paradigm,"[26] the government's capacity to enact cultural policies is limited, and the responsibility of the government is also restricted. Also, in the realm of culture and arts, uncertainties are high, as it involves human behavior and emotions (Kim J., 2016). Scholars, such as Demers (2010), insist that music and culture should be autonomous with purposive purposelessness in order to appreciate the true beauty of the art. When music

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[26] In contrast to the "prince paradigm," which expects the government to be a "perfect problem solver", the "beast paradigm" accepts the limits of the government, and rather emphasizes passive and indirect government support on culture (김정수, 2018).

becomes potential political propaganda, it loses its power as a universal language. Thus, in a globalized world, popular culture should be depoliticized and neutralized to gain wider audience reception in the international market (Iwabuchi 2004; Lu 2008).

2. Supply: Bottom-Up *Hallyu*

On the supply side, the impact of the South Korean government's *hallyu* policies was limited. In fact, *hallyu* was a "success without design." It was an unexpected sociocultural phenomenon without any coordinated policies by the South Korean government. This is in contrast to the "Miracle on the Han River (한강의 기적)," which was achieved through strong government intervention (김정수, 2002, 2006, 2014, 2016). Conversely, *hallyu* was a market-oriented

< **Figure 2** > Bottom-Up Hallyu

product of "naked commercialism" that was not particularly "Korean" in order to be easily sold and exported (Lie, 2012).

Hallyu was the result of a bottom-up sociocultural movement built from the civil level, as depicted in < Figure 2 >. The main

actors in the growth of *hallyu* were the entertainment industry and fandoms backed by advanced technology. The Korean government indirectly supported *hallyu* and the government's policies became effective via cooperation with the private sector.

Though the South Korean government created the Ministry of Culture and Sports in 1994, there were no direct *hallyu* policies until the *hallyu* boom emerged in China and Japan from the late-1990s. Also, the policies employed by the ROK government, such as "The Participatory Government's Cultural Industry Policy Vision to Realize the Top Five Cultural Powers in the World (세계 5대 문화산업 강국 실현을 위한 참여정부 문화산업 정책비전)" in 2003, faced hostility by the foreign public, and was criticized for its unilateral, commercial, and intrusive intentions. As anti-*hallyu* sentiment worsened, the South Korean government responded by collaborating with the private sector and supporting two-way cultural exchange and cooperation, as well as proposing the diversification and enhanced creativity of cultural content. From the early-2010s, the public and private sectors actively cooperated through government programs, such as the "Good *Hallyu* Private-Public Cooperation Project," and formed the public-private "Advisory Committee on the Promotion of Korean Wave Culture," the "Korean Wave Support Council," and the "*Hallyu* Planning Group."[27] Recently, to assuage the foreign

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[27] < *Hallyu* Planning Group (한류 기획단) >

P	Business	CJ E&M
r		Broadcasting Corporation
i		KBS
v		SBS
a	Broadcasting	MBC
t		Arirang International Broadcasting
e		Korean Traditional Music Broadcasting

public's concerns about *hallyu*'s cultural dominance, the South Korean government has supported the "Kind *Hallyu*" policy, which promotes two-way cultural exchanges rather than one-way *hallyu* expansion. The collaboration between the public and private sectors induced corporate social responsibility, productively reflected the voices at the civil level, and further encouraged international cultural exchanges (MCST; 국가기록원; 김정수, 2018; 문효진, 2018).[28] Hence, the South Korean government's role in *hallyu* was unintentional and ineffective at the beginning, but later became more responsive through cooperation with the private sector as a bottom-up progress.

	Academia	World Hallyu Association
	Drama	Drama Production Company Association
	Movie	Lotte Cinema
	Music	SM Entertainment
		YG Entertainment
		JYP Entertainment
	Design	Seoul Design Foundation
	Literacy	Ewha Media Center
	Finance	Korea Venture Investment
	Performance	PMC Production
	Fashion	Kolon Industry
	Beauty	Amore Pacific
	Food	CJ Foodville
	Mecenat	Korea Mecenat Association
	Trade	Korea International Trade Association
	Actor/Actress	Choi Boolam
Public	Government Organizations	Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism
		Ministry of Foreign Affairs
		Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs
		Ministry of Trade, Industry and Energy
		Ministry of Science, ICT and Future Planning
		Korea Communications Commission
	Public Institutions	Korea Foundation for International Culture Exchange
		Korea Creative Content Agency

[28] Refer to "**< Appendix 6 >** South Korean Government's *Hallyu* Policies, Systems, and Laws" for details.

3. Demand: Subculture

On the demand side, K-pop is acknowledged as a subculture in China and Japan that is relatively detached from politics. Based on the theory of subculture, there are diverse subset groups that pursue alternative values and exercise distinct practices (Blackman, 2005). Therefore, subcultural identities are numerous and fluid where individuals are autonomous and diffused from political understanding (Muggleton 2000). K-pop is classified as a musical subculture, as it is reliant on but alternative to the mass culture. Compared to other popular mass music genres, K-pop emphasizes visual elements, which are presented through spectacular visuals, fashion, dancing, performances, etc.[29] Also, visual online platforms such as YouTube are the main means to access K-pop (최정봉, 2014). In China, K-pop is generally consumed by enthusiastic Hanmi and Hāhánzú K-fans. In Japan, K-pop has stabilized as a regular everyday cultural practice, reflecting diverse Japanese preferences and going beyond an unusual and temporary fad (윤경원·나미수, 2004; 정수영 외, 2018). In both China and Japan, people are familiar with *hallyu* as a common subculture. In fact, according to KOFICE's annual survey, 84.8% of respondents in China and 92.4% in Japan said that they are aware of the term "*hallyu*" compared to the global average of 55.6% (2020). Thus, in China and Japan, *hallyu* and K-pop are accepted as subcultures, where personal appreciation

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[29] For instance, the popularity of G-dragon's music and performance has further attracted interests on his style followed by many admirers, and is renowned in the fashion industry as a "fashionista" who owns a fashion brand *PEACEMINUSONE*.

of K-pop is regarded as a depoliticized form of leisure.

In addition, consumers of K-pop in both China and Japan are generally part of the digital generation, which is relatively apolitical. The advanced technological environment enabled the digital generation to be influenced by immense information and multiple opinions via the internet, and, therefore, they have been exposed to divided political opinions (Kim, 2011). Also, disembodied online identities are easily detached from the social and political contexts of identities formed offline (Tian, 2017). The digital generation is relatively individualistic and independent. So, they pursue political freedom separate from cultural activities (Frame and Brachotte, 2018; Litsas and Tziampiris, 2016). Thus, K-pop fans engage in fandom practices as a form of leisure to satisfy their desires in local social contexts distinct from politics (Fedorenko, 2017). Likewise, transnational fans tend to defend their K-pop idol stars as innocent victims of the malicious political powers, thus justifying their fandom loyalties amidst conflicting political discourses (Tsai, 2007, 2008). Therefore, political conflicts are less likely to affect *hallyu* consumption.

Moreover, it has become more difficult for governments to regulate K-pop consumption as online distribution channels have become more diversified in China and Japan. Specifically, piracy and copyright infringement have been serious issues in China. They are due to the easy access to cheap illegal copies and government protectionism of the Chinese cultural industry, which has led the complicated inspection process to become a mere formality. In China, free online downloads and pirated CDs and DVDs are so easily accessible that it is difficult to regulate the illegal circulation of Korean popular content online (고정민, 2016).

Furthermore, music is less ideologically driven compared to other *hallyu* content, such as dramas or movies, so the government is less likely to control it (임대근, 2020). For instance, anti-*hallyu* feelings have mostly arisen from historical dramas—such as *A Jewel in the Palace (대장금)*, *Daejoyong (대조영)*, *Jumong (주몽)*, and *The Legend (태왕사신기)*—or movies—such as *TaeGukGi: The Brotherhood of War (태극기 휘날리며)*, and *Once Upon a Time in a Battlefield (황산벌)*—which contain controversial narratives regarding historical distortion. In contrast, K-pop music is less prone to government restrictions.

4. Politics and K-Pop

However, *hallyu*, including K-pop, cannot be completely exempt from politics. *Hallyu* is, in fact, culturally political as it represents "Koreanness" and is affected by national power structures and imbalanced cultural flows. Thus, *hallyu* producers strategically weigh the political considerations of *hallyu* exports (Jin, 2016, 2020). The South Korean government has also created conditions in which the private sector can take advantage of such benefits as diplomatic resources and networks, promoting creativity and innovation in production, education support, and so on. Moreover, *hallyu* has been used to promote Korean interests and national prestige overseas (Walsh, 2014). *Hallyu* has been internationalized and commercialized

under the nation brand of "Korean culture," increasing interest in Korea as a country due to the underlying Koreanness exposed to the users (조병철·심희철, 2013). Likewise, within South Korea, *hallyu* stars are ideally expected to be national representatives, compatriots, and cultural ambassadors (Fedorenko, 2017), as *hallyu* has become a symbol of national pride (Kim J., 2016).

Furthermore, *hallyu* dynamics in China are purposefully shaped by the Chinese government's policies on Korean imports and the South Korean government's policies on exports, meaning that consumer desire is not simply an autonomous force generated by the private sector (Chen, 2017). The Chinese government regulated Korean contents with regards to ideology, yet tolerated local capital including online video platforms to advantage from commercializing *hallyu* content (Chen and Reese, 2015). Also, Korean popular culture encouraged Chinese people to better understand South Korea by accentuating cultural affinity between the two countries based on the common Eastern culture of Confucian tradition (Jang, 2012). Likewise, *hallyu* has led to a turning point for ties between South Korea and Japan by helping to improve diplomatic relations (정수영 외, 2018).

Hallyu has further provided opportunities for Japanese to critically reflect on their perceptions and attitudes towards issues related to ethnic Korean residents in Japan as well as historical tensions between the two states (양은경, 2006). Meanwhile, anti-*hallyu* trends can be perceived as retaliation against a dominant foreign culture imposed by South Korea's soft power. This is because soft power may stir up antagonistic feelings and face backlash in other countries as the promotion of culture risks being criticized as cultural chauvinism (Schjønberg, 2019). Moreover,

political and historical tensions between countries are the top drawback for *hallyu*[30] and K-pop[31] in both China and Japan (KOFICE, 2020). For these reasons, *hallyu* cannot be completely detached from politics. It is insufficient to solely explain the resilience and popularity of K-pop despite anti-Korean sentiments in China and Japan with relative apoliticism. Hence, this research emphasizes a sense of "connectedness" and affinity as the underlying core reasons for the sustainability of K-pop.

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[30] Refer to the footnote < Top Reasons for Anti-*Hallyu* > on page 4.

[31] < K-pop Drawback Factors (Top 3) >

	China	Japan
1	Difficult and unfamiliar Korean lyrics (22%)	Political/Historical relations (25.5%)
2	Political/Historical relations (14.4%)	Monolithic music genre (16.3%)
3	Monolithic music genre (14.4%)	Difficult and unfamiliar Korean lyrics (14.9%)

Chapter Ⅳ. K-Pop Connectedness

1. Music: Harmony of Understanding

K-pop creates strong ties that enable it to be resilient against antagonism. One variable is the characteristic of music that harmonizes bonds of understanding. Music can connect people and create a shared sense of "we" by influencing the moods and behaviors of many people at once (Juslin, 2003; Loersch and Arbuckle, 2013). Diverse listeners who experience the same beat, timbre, etc. in music can empathize with one another and feel the same emotions (Steinbeis and Koelsch, 2011). This shared experience of listening to the same music and feeling similar emotions strengthens relations and sociality amongst the group of listeners (Fosler-Lussier 2012; Hesmondalgh, 2013). Music molds individual beings into a coordinated group based on the common humanity in musicality (Laurence, 2008; Shank, 2014). Music stimulates social cohesiveness and strengthens bonds (Dunbar, 2012; Freeman, 2000; Hagen and Bryant, 2003; Roederer, 1984) to the point that it can bind listeners into virtual communities and reinforce social identities (Born, 2012; Brown and Volgsten, 2006; Shelemay, 2011). Likewise, music's kinetic expression through dance also universally conveys feelings (Sievers et al., 2012). The synchronization of movement in response to the music strengthens affiliation and social attachment among group members, which increases cooperation (Demos et al., 2012; Hove and Risen, 2009; Wiltermuth and Heath, 2009).

In this way, K-pop emotionally communicates with listeners through music and dance performances. This is further realized through united K-pop fans with a strong sense of connectedness and solidarity. K-pop listeners form associations based on music and idol group preferences known as fandoms. These fandoms create their own unique identities, which are symbolized by light sticks, balloons, banners, etc. For instance, BIGBANG's fandom is called VIP and is symbolized by yellow crown light sticks, while BTS' fandom is named ARMY and is represented by purple bomb light sticks. Each of these symbols is meant to portray each fandom's exclusive identity. K-pop fandoms share a sense of collectivity, as stars and fans emotionally connect and communicate through listening and singing to the same music and dancing to the same synchronized choreography movements. Fans chant along with songs and synchronize their movements by swinging light sticks on beat during performances. Moreover, K-pop choruses and K-pop idol's dance moves become trends. For instance, the addictive chorus[32] of BIGBANG's "Fantastic Baby"[33] has led many listeners to become fans. The song was composed by G-dragon and Teddy, and the lyrics were written by G-dragon and TOP. It was also produced by G-dragon[34], the leader of BIGBANG, to successfully convey the

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[32] Chorus: "Wow fantastic baby, Dance, I wanna dan dan dan dan dance fantastic baby,…,Boom shakalaka"

[33] "Fantastic Baby" ranked 1st among "The 10 Best BIGBANG Songs: Critics Pick by Billboard (December 23, 2016).

[34] G-dragon is a famous singer, songwriter, and producer. He earns the highest royalties on music among all K-pop idols (Korea Music Copyright Association 한국음악저작권협회). G-dragon and BIGBANG were one of the first K-pop idols/groups that escaped criticisms

exciting feeling of the music so that the musicians and the listeners could emotionally bond and enjoy themselves together.

Moreover, music automatically conveys feelings as a "universal language" that can transcend borders without requiring culturally transmitted semantic structures or direct interactions (Fritz et al., 2009; Loersch and Arbuckle, 2013). Distinct from other cultural practices such as verbal language, music and movement transmit emotions universally, making them understandable across cultures despite inherent cultural differences (Brown and Jordania, 2013; Cross and Woodruff, 2009; Sievers et al., 2012). In this way, music creates a sense of connectedness that allows it to transcend cultural divides, which further fosters cross-cultural communication (Gienow-Hecht, 2009; Schjønberg, 2019). Amidst the rise of nationalism and international discord, music has become a common platform of togetherness. This shared humanity in music created a cultural hybrid community across different imagined narratives of identity, culture, and nationhood (Schjønberg, 2019). This is how K-pop music was able to gain huge popularity in China and Japan despite anti-Korean sentiment.

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of being "factory idols"—which is a common critique in K-pop that idols with similar characteristics and song styles are manufactured and sold by entertainment factories—by creating their own songs and performances. BIGBANG gained popularity with a professional image as "artists" instead of "idols" (Kim S. J., 2018).

2. Technology Development: Online Network

2-1. Digital Revolution

Another fundamental element that contributed to the connectedness of K-pop is technological development.[35] The success of K-pop coincided with the digital

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[35] < Republic of Korea Internet Penetration (% of population) >

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
South Korea	1.62	3.60	6.78	23.5	44.7	56.6	59.4	65.5	72.7	73.5	78.1	78.8	81.0	81.6	83.7	83.7	84.0	84.7	87.5	89.9	92.8	95.0	95.9	96.1

[Source: World Bank]

The internet penetration rate of South Korea has rapidly increased, surpassing 50% in 2001 and 90% in 2016. Currently, ROK's internet penetration rate of 96.1% is the highest in the Asia-Pacific region.

Refer to < Graph 3 > and < Graph 4 > for the internet penetration rates of China and Japan, respectively.

Northeast Asia along with the Americas and European nations have been the fastest to network through the internet. This has enabled simultaneous and transnational access to *hallyu* content (홍석경, 2013).

revolution in the cultural industry (Colombo 2018; KOCCA, 2020). In the 21st century, all sectors of cultural production were digitalized and online platforms, such as GAFA (Google, Apple, Facebook, and Amazon on the US bloc) and BATH (Baidu, Alibaba, Tencent, and Huawei on the Chinese bloc), were introduced (Campbell et al., 2019). K-pop benefited from the global flux of technological advancement—the enhanced speed and persistence of information, improved accessibility, economic feasibility, the diversity and plurality of users, etc. K-pop content and information became permanently available via multimedia on both computers and mobile devices anytime, anywhere (김미연·권석정, 2019; 서황욱, 2019; 원용진 2019; 홍석경, 2013). Digitization and internet-enabled platforms have lowered the costs of an individual's cultural participation (Peukert, 2018). Accordingly, online streaming via mobile and online platforms has become the main means to experience K-pop in both China and Japan (KOFICE, 2012-2020). Thus, the evolution of technology and new media have dissolved boundaries across space and time, building a structural foundation for K-pop content to be effectively networked, provided, and consumed in both China and Japan.

2-2. Social Media

Social media has reinforced the connectedness of K-pop. The development of social media displaced the previous role of traditional media, and facilitated simultaneous and transnational cultural opportunities to experience Korean popular culture content (Wajcman, 2015). In fact, according to global social media research, social media usage has grown to such an extent that in 2019, social media users numbered 3.484 billion out of the 4.388 billion internet users worldwide (Baglari et al., 2020). Social media is defined as digital media platforms that allow users to engage with and create content, add comments, and interact with others (Campbell et al., 2019). It is built upon Web 2.0, an open online space that enables the creation and exchange of user-generated contents (Brown, 2011). Social media can be categorized into social networking sites (SNS),[36] such as Facebook; user-driven online platforms, such as YouTube and Instagram; and microblogs, such as Twitter (Au 2020). Social media has allowed for simultaneous distribution and consumption of K-pop across diverse social spaces. In fact, K-pop is generally streamed through music videos on YouTube (최정봉, 2014), which offers social connections and low barriers for media creation (Chau, 2010). For example, the success of PSY's "Gangnam Style" is largely attributed to social media platforms such as YouTube and Twitter. The song was easily accessible on social media because the K-pop industry did not legally charge for the distribution of the

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[36] SNS is not identical to social media. SNS construct public profiles and share connections. Networking on SNS is usually an extension of offline networks rather than meeting new people (Boyd and Ellison, 2008).

original music video, nor for the production and dissemination of parodies and remixes (Jin, 2020; Tan et al., 2020). PSY's music video and trademark "horse dance" was parodied in flash mobs and viral videos that circulated around online platforms, which further promoted the song itself (룽, 2019). The song gained popularity through social media and was later introduced in traditional media, such as television shows. Through this process, "media convergence" [37] occurred between traditional and new media (Jin and Yoon, 2016).

Social media generates a "participatory culture" [38] that allows for simultaneous interactivity and interlinks imagined collectives across space and time, nurturing connectivity (Dijck, 2013). It forms networks grounded on common values and experiences (Au 2020; Baym and Ledbetter, 2009; Wellman and Rainie, 2012), and allows for self-projection of emotions and ideas online, which supports the formation of mutual understanding (Savicki and Kelley, 2000) and collective identity (Eyerman and Jamison, 1998). It also encourages interpersonal interactions that form bonds of solidarity and facilitates sociality (Terranova and Donovan,

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[37] Jenkins separates "media convergence" into technical convergence (from traditional to new digital media); social convergence (consumer's multitasking between platforms); cultural convergence (transmedia storytelling); and global convergence (international cultural hybridity) (2006).

[38] "The term, participatory culture, is intended to contrast with older notions of media spectatorship. In this emerging media system, what might traditionally be understood as media producers and consumers are transformed into participants who are expected to interact with each other according to a new set of rules which none of us fully understands." (Jenkins, 2006)

2013). Social media has enabled the web to be more "social" so that communication on social media engenders intimacy and immediacy, and users feel a social presence during online interactions. So, according to the "social presence theory" (SPT), online communication further promotes socializing and bonding beyond physical boundaries (Biocca et al., 2003). Correspondingly, social media has encouraged K-pop users to express their emotions and empathize together, further connecting people and building solidarity (김미연·권석정, 2019; 서황욱, 2019; 원용진 2019).

3. K-Pop Supply

3-1. Institutional Analysis: K-Entertainment Industry

The institutional analysis method evaluates factors that make K-pop resilient on the supply side, which is mainly led by the Korean entertainment industry. K-pop's comparative advantage in the global market is due to the large entertainment companies' strategies—from casting, training, and producing to marketing—which widened and deepened the relationships between stars and fans (고정민, 2016).

3-1-1. Total Management System

K-pop stars are organized and nurtured through the "total management system" (aka "in-house system"), which is an all-encompassing central management system specialized in South Korea. Agencies cast promising teenagers based on a systematic audition process and intensively train them for multiple years in music, dance, performance, foreign language, etc. Thus, typical K-pop idols can sing and perform not only in Korean, but also in English, Japanese, and Chinese, which presents glocal familiarity to K-pop consumers in China and Japan. The best trainees go on to debut in idol groups, signing long-term contracts with entertainment companies, living in company dorms, and carrying out demanding training (Fedorenko, 2017; Kim, 2018; 이규탁, 2018). The debut process, from auditioning to training, is also occasionally aired on television shows and online platforms, such as YouTube and Netflix, so audiences can watch the debut process and even cast votes for trainees they root for to debut. For instance, in 2018, Mnet's

"Produce 101" from South Korea and Yasushi Akimoto (秋元 康), the producer of

the group AKB48 from Japan, co-launched a survival audition program, "Produce

48." Through this program, they co-produced IZ*ONE, which consists of nine

Korean members and three Japanese members. In this way, interactive participation

via encouraging and selecting idol candidates allowed viewers to sympathize with

and feel attached to their idols.

3-1-2. Glocalization

Korean entertainment companies employed diverse hybridization strategies

that offered glocal familiarity to Chinese and Japanese audiences. Glocalization

(globalization+localization) integrates globalization processes with diverse local

realities and recreates a distinct culture (Ritzer 2011; 김두진, 2018; 조규헌, 2018).

This has lowered the cultural discount rates of K-pop content and allowed it to be

familiarly accepted without backlash for being foreign (고정민, 2016). K-pop

features a glocal identity with a mixture of Eastern and Western cultures, which is

neither too traditional nor unfamiliar, allowing it to suit a variety of tastes for

diverse audiences (Hong-Mercier, 2013; Jang et al., 2012). Korean music has been

largely influenced by Japanese music, which was influenced by American and

European music (Ng 2004; 이종임, 2013), yet has developed a unique Koreanness,

which decentralized and repositioned the global cultural transformation (Ryoo,

2009; Shim, 2006; 류웅재, 2008). K-pop has advanced a mix of local tastes and

global trends by following the classic songwriting style—intro, verse, pre-hooks, b-

hooks in the chorus—and linguistically hybridizing lyrics by frequently mixing English and Korean (Jin, 2020). K-pop uses various music genres, such as electronic music, hip-hop, jazz, folk music, and R&B (Nesmeyanov et al., 2019; 장원호·송정은, 2016), yet it is distinctively characterized by vivid images, complex and synchronized choreography, addictive and repetitive choruses, and upbeat and catchy melodic songs. K-pop has deconstructed, altered, reassembled, and reversed the flow of popular music spreading from the dominant western and Japanese culture (Bridge 2018; Fuhr, 2015; 이기형 2005). The transnational mobility of cultural practices has softened the linguistic and cultural barriers of K-pop, so that it can be accepted with some level of familiarity in Chinese and Japanese culture (Jang and Song, 2018; Jin and Yoon, 2016; 김두진, 2018).

K-entertainment companies recruit global talents from different ethnic origins in Asia to both appeal to the Asian public with their Asian identity and familiarity, but also to enhance exportability (Lee, 2008). The hybridization of eastern moral values based on Confucianism, and the characteristics of rapid modernization as developmental states in East Asia has highlighted commonality among Asian consumers (Jang 2012). For instance, SM entertainment has divided sub-units within K-pop idols groups targeting specific countries. The group NCT, for instance, has diverse sub-units. The sub-unit WayV(威神V) targets China, and NCT 127 focuses on Japan and South Korea. WayV is under LABEL V, SM entertainment's subsidiary company in China, and is comprised of members from China, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macao, and Thailand. NCT 127 includes members of

Korean, Japanese, American, Canadian, and Chinese nationalities, and is also under Avex in Japan. SM has also divided EXO into EXO-K and EXO-M to target Korea and China, respectively. JYP entertainment's nine-member girl group TWICE also consists of five Koreans, three Japanese, and one Taiwanese member. Consequently, EXO is famous in China[39] and TWICE is popular in Japan[40] due to the sense of connectedness formed through glocal nationalities (고정민, 2016; 김경희, 2018;

유성만, 2019; 장·펑, 2019).

Korean entertainment companies have further formed partnerships with local record labels and have also built subsidiary companies in China and Japan to effectively adapt to local preferences and needs. For example, SM entertainment's TVXQ has partnered with Japan's major record labels, such as Avex (エイベックス・グループ), and produced Japanese albums with Matsuo Kiyoshi

(松尾潔), a famous Japanese producer, along with Japanese staff. When promoting

in Japan, TVXQ's albums were all in Japanese, the members used Japanese in all programs they participated in, and they communicated with fans in Japanese on

Twitter (고정민 외, 2011). Also, Universal Sigma under Universal Music Japan

(ユニバーサル ミュージック ジャパン) signed contracts with DSP Media in

2010 for Kara's debut and promotions in Japan. Kara followed the standard Japanese debut route and promotion strategies, such as handshake events, a

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[39] Refer to "< **Table 1 >** The Popularity of *Hallyu* in China" for more information.

[40] Refer to "< **Table 3 >** The Popularity of *Hallyu* in Japan" for more information.

guerrilla showcase in the center of Shibuya, and official showcases, which supported Kara's successful debut in Japan (고정민 외, 2011). JYP Entertainment has also branched out to China and Japan, creating affiliations such as JYP Beijing Cultural Exchange Ltd, JYP Entertainment Hong Kong Limited, JYP Entertainment Japan Inc, etc. In addition, JYP jointly produced NCC entertainment with China's Tencent Music. YG Entertainment and Japan's Avex Group have also co-launched YGEX, a record label that assists YG entertainment idols such as BIGBANG on promotions and concert tours in Japan. Overall, various hybridization strategies employed by the Korean entertainment industry have alleviated cultural barriers and provided glocal familiarity catering to local preferences in China and Japan.

3-1-3. Transmedia Storytelling

K-pop idols are produced with attractive looks and personas that are presented as unique intellectual properties (IP), interlinked with an imagined community known as the "story world" (김희경, 2020). An idol's physical appearance is often molded through exercise and plastic surgery to embody the ideal of physical attractiveness (Fedorenko, 2017). Their public image and personal privacy are strictly managed by the company, and each member is assigned a distinct persona to capture the tastes of a diverse audience. Entertainment companies diversify a K-pop idol's IP into multiple media forms, such as official websites, social media, music videos, concert VCRs, games, music, albums, goods, etc. The idols also display their persona through various media, from music videos and performances

to commercials and reality shows (이동배, 2019; 조민선, 2020). Through "transmedia storytelling,"[41] each idol member, with their unique persona, is connected to one story world. Users are also encouraged to interactively participate and generate contexts that contribute to the overall narrative in the story world (Ryan, 2016). For instance, BTS' story world is "growing youth," in which fans also empathize and share their own stories, adding on to the overall narratives such as "love yourself." Transmedia storytelling has enabled stars and fans to empathize, connect, communicate, and further build solidarity (이동배, 2019; 정지은, 2019; 조민선, 2020)

3-1-4. Social Media Marketing

Large South Korean entertainment companies' marketing strategies utilize social media channels, which provide a sense of proximity for K-pop consumers. Korean entertainment companies promote exclusive content on social media dependent markets (Ahn et al. 2013; Jin and Yoon, 2016). They profit from lowered transaction costs, effectively waived fees on the enforcement of copyrights, and royalty incomes from multinational enterprises' advertisements, which further

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[41] "Transmedia storytelling (≈ transmedia narrative ≈ multiplatform storytelling)" "represents a process where integral elements of a fiction get dispersed systematically across multiple delivery channels for the purpose of creating a unified and coordinated entertainment experience. Ideally, each medium makes its own unique contribution to the unfolding of the story…Transmedia storytelling is the ideal aesthetic form for an era of collective intelligence." (Jenkins, 2006)

benefits K-pop users as well (Oh and Lee, 2013; Oh and Park, 2012; Peukert, 2018). Moreover, individual K-pop stars are encouraged to self-promote and constantly communicate with fans through social media (김미연·권석정, 2019; 서황욱, 2019; 원용진 2019). Sharing content reflecting the star's own thoughts and details of their everyday life provides a sense of proximity and connection. It deepens familiarity between stars and fans, which further strengthens affinity amongst them (Kim, 2018). For example, the worldwide success of BTS has been attributed to their active use of social media platforms such as V-app and YouTube, which helped them develop bonds with overseas fans. BTS could interactively communicate and empathize with fans by sharing their music videos, stage performances, and daily lives on their official YouTube channel "BANGTAN TV" (강준만, 2020).

In Japan, the main means to access K-pop is YouTube (KOFICE, 2020). There has been an official K-pop category set up by Google since 2011, and South Korean main entertainment companies and K-pop stars have their own YouTube channels. For instance, SM entertainment opened its YouTube channel in 2006, and YG, JYP, and Big Hit opened theirs in 2008 (강준만, 2020). In China, online platforms are strictly regulated by the Chinese government, commonly known as the "Chinese Great Firewall." This has induced Korean entertainment companies to agree upon strategic partnerships and exclusive contracts with large Chinese online platforms to facilitate international marketing. YG entertainment has signed an MOU (Memorandum of Understanding) with Youku (优酷), and attracted an ¥85

million CNY investment from "Tencent" and "Wepiao." QQ Music under Tencent has released BIGBANG's albums from YG, and they were successful in China. SM entertainment has signed an MOU with Baidu (百度) and partnered with Alibaba.

Alibaba invested ¥190 million CNY in SM and acquired 4% of its stake, and has further provided services for SM entertainment's K-pop idol's music through the mobile music applications "Tiantian" and "Shami." JYP has agreed to exclusive contracts with Baidu and copyright agreements with "Omusic" (KOCCA, 2014; 장·펑, 2019). Additionally, Korean broadcasting companies, such as KBS, MBC, SBS, etc., have signed content supply agreements with large online Chinese platforms to efficiently supply *hallyu* content to consumers in China (Gong and Lee, 2015). Thus, the South Korean entertainment industry's marketing strategies using social media have effectively connected K-pop providers and consumers.

4. K-Pop Demand

4-1. User Analysis: Digital Generation

The user analysis method addresses the success of K-pop on the demand side. The popularity of K-pop music is youth-oriented, and the majority of K-pop consumers are digital natives (aka generations Y and Z) that grew up in an environment with advanced technology (Jin, 2020). According to the International Telecommunication Union (ITU), a digital native is defined as "a youth, aged 15 to 24 inclusive, with five years or more experience using the Internet." Ipsos cited that only 16% of the pre-war generation and 49% of the Baby Boomer generation use the internet more than once per day, whereas 68% of Generation X and 77% of Generation Y (aka Millennials) are online every day (Nesmeyanov et al., 2019). Worldwide, young people are at the forefront of internet adoption, and are nearly two times more networked than the global population as a whole (UN, 2020). In the Asia-Pacific region, 70.3% of youths use the internet compared to 44.5% of the total population (ITU, 2019). The young generations are the most active users of ICT (information and communications technology), and ICT has supported young people to mobilize and collaborate internationally (UN, 2020). The digital generation is able to simultaneously and transnationally access K-pop content online. In the context of digital sharing culture, the digital generation interacted based on common cultural experiences and the value homophily of K-pop. On relatively equal footings, they voluntarily interacted and associated by expressing feelings and sharing opinions and information about K-pop that further built solidarity (Jin and Yoon, 2016). The nature of cultural consumption for the digital

generation have transformed from previous generations through technological digitalization. For the digital generation, consuming popular culture was a participatory process of information learning, content sharing, communication, connection, and identity formation, rather than a process of acquiring physical items (Au 2020; Jin, 2020; Jin and Yoon, 2016).

4-2. Fandom Unity

The unity of fandoms has been the underlying strength of K-pop's resilience against animosity in China and Japan. Fandoms are a general phenomenon in popular culture, and can be defined as fan communities for certain stars or genres in which fans actively produce and spread cultural content (Jeong, 2016). The advancement of interactive online platforms has facilitated fan activities and allowed fandoms to create a "convergence culture," where they actively converge to seek pleasure and connect information between dispersed media contents (Jenkins, 1992, 2006). K-pop fans further associate and construct a collective identity (Ulusoy and Schembri, 2018) that is symbolized through fan club names, goods, special light sticks, etc. (Nesmeyanov et al., 2019). The formation of a fan identity is related to an individual's pleasure and preferred consumption (Miles, 1995). As such, the motive for joining a K-pop fandom is to share common experiences, emotions, passion, and affection towards idolized K-pop stars or the K-pop music genre. The shared identity among K-pop fans unites them to take collective action, such as participating in fandom campaigns. For example, K-pop fans publicly express their identity by participating in auctions and donations in the

name of their favorite idols (KOCCA, 2019; 최정봉, 2014). In addition, fans collectively vote for stars and songs, and promote their favorites using hash tags on social media. Fans call this type of grass-root marketing "guerillas" (이지행, 2019). Thus, K-pop fandoms identify and express their support for K-pop stars and music through their collective identity and strong social bonding.

K-pop fandom culture is "participatory" (Jenkins, 1992, 2006), as K-pop fans distribute and circulate information about K-pop idols and music, and further re-create and expand Korean popular content with affinity as their driving force. They stimulate the expansion of K-pop and *hallyu* as active "prosumers (producer+consumer)." In this way, they are not just spectators and consumers, but are also contributors and producers (Berbiguier and Cho, 2017; Jenkins, 1992; 송정은·장원호, 2013). K-pop fans re-produce K-pop content through "fan-subbing"[42] along with translating and re-sharing supplementary contents. Fans create reaction videos for K-pop music videos, empathizing emotions and sharing their thoughts on social media. They also imitate idol choreographies through "cover-dances" and flash mobs. Overall, K-pop fans participate and add to the original content and redistribute them both offline and online[43] (룽, 2019). Such

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[42] 'Fan-subbing' includes soft-subbing (translated text in separate file), hard-subbing (translated subtitles on the original video), and viki (simultaneous translation such as through comments). Prosuming activities such as fan-subbing may also face copyright issues (Dwyer, 2016).

[43] Fans are voluntary prosumers, yet Korean entertainment companies also strategicall

fandom activities resemble free labor in the digital economy (Terranova, 2000; 룽, 2019), with aspects of a "gift economy" (Turk, 2014) and an "emotional economy" (장·펑, 2019), which operates on gratitude, recognition, and affection towards K-pop stars and music (최정봉, 2014). Fans multiply and spread collective intelligence across social spaces and strengthen the bridges and bonds of social capital by creating networks between people and the media (송정은·장원호, 2013).

Therefore, K-pop fandoms play a crucial role in creating social and cultural ties among transnational fans (Kim, 2018). K-pop fans actively take part in the recreation, circulation, distribution, and expansion of Korean popular culture. They bonded and developed collective affinity based on their strong emotional attachment to stars.

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y collaborate with fandoms and produce interactive contents. For example, in G-dragon's "Who you? (니가 뭔데)" music video, fans interactively engaged as participants in the music video. Fans directly communicated with the star and fan-chanted along to the song. Their personal camera recordings were also inserted in the final music video. These fans also uploaded hidden scenes during the video shooting on social media, which further spread the popularity of the song (Kim S.Y., 2018). In this process, fans were both producers and consumers (the prerequisite for participating in the music video shooting was to buy the album).

4-3. *China*

K-pop in China is mostly consumed by the digital generation that is unified through fandoms. In fact, according to < Graph 3 >, the internet penetration rate has rapidly increased in China over previous decades, reaching 883 million internet users in 2019. Among them, 882 million also use social media. Also, according to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), China has the largest fan base in the Asia-Pacific with 69 fan communities (KF, 2019).

< Graph 3 > China Internet Penetration (% of population)

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
China	0.01	0.03	0.17	0.71	1.78	2.64	4.60	6.20	7.30	8.52	10.5	16.0	22.6	28.9	34.3	38.3	42.3	45.8	47.9	50.3	53.2	54.3	54.3	54.3

[Source] World Bank

< Table 5 > *Hallyu* Content Mediums in China

| China	Music	Dramas
2012	Online, Mobile Platform (75%)	Online, Mobile Platform (79.5%)
	TV (51.5%)	TV (19%)
2013	Online, Mobile Platform (77.75%)	TV (85.25%)
	TV (57.75%)	Online, Mobile Platform (79.25%)
2014	TV (63.7%)	TV (83%)
	Online, Mobile Platform (52.5%)	Online, Mobile Platform (57.2%)

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2015	Online, Mobile Platform (56.3%)	TV (81.5%)
	TV (55.5%)	Online, Mobile Platform (59%)
2016	Online, Mobile Platform (58.2%)	TV (74.9%)
	TV (53%)	Online, Mobile Platform (63.3%)
2017	Online, Mobile Platform (67.1%)	Online, Mobile Platform (58%)
	TV (41.1%)	TV (55.4%)
2018	Online, Mobile Platform (56.5%)	Online, Mobile Platform (61.6%)
	TV (48.1%)	TV (59.2%)
2019	Online, Mobile Platform (88.7%)	TV (79.2%)
	TV (45.7%)	OTT (64.8%)
2020	Online, Mobile Platform (83.7%)	Online, Mobile Platform (78.9%)
	TV (74.3%)	TV (71%)

[Source] Global Research, MCST, KOFICE

Moreover, as shown in < Table 5 >, Chinese consumers access *hallyu* content, particularly K-pop, through mostly online and mobile platforms. This implies that distribution channels for popular culture have diversified, expanding from satellite broadcasts into new media, which have eased access to K-pop content despite the "Chinese Great Firewall." As the Chinese government strictly regulates online platforms, K-pop fans in China have formed a particular cultural nexus and economic structure with Korean entertainment companies. Big fans (大粉丝) with

VIP accounts on social media platforms, such as Weibo and Tudou, arrange transactions of K-pop idol cultural goods between Korean entertainment companies and regular fans (粉丝) (장·펑, 2019). For instance, Sina Weibo (新浪微博), one of the most frequently used online platforms in China, has over 120 official accounts for Korean celebrities. Stars share their daily lives and schedules, and fans show their support through likes, comments, and postings. Big fans deliver news and information on K-pop idol stars, hold events and campaigns, and also sell K-pop goods to regular fans (Xi, 2017). This online interaction creates a sense of intimacy between K-pop fans and idols.

4-4. Japan

Similarly, K-pop in Japan is also consumed by the digital generation, which communicates through fandoms. According to < Graph 4 >, the internet penetration rate in Japan has been over 80% for the last decade. In 2019, internet users reached 116.1 million, and social media users reached 82.6 million. Moreover, there are currently 61 *hallyu* fan communities in Japan (KF, 2019).

< Graph 4 > Japan Internet Penetration (% of population)

	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Japan	4.37	9.16	13.4	21.3	29.9	38.5	46.5	48.4	62.3	66.9	68.6	74.3	75.4	78.0	78.2	79.0	79.5	88.2	89.1	91.0	93.1	84.5	84.5	84.5

[Source] World Bank

< Table 6 > *Hallyu* Content Mediums in Japan

Japan	Music	Dramas
2012	TV (77.5%)	TV (65.5%)
	Online, Mobile Platform (25.5%)	Online, Mobile Platform (14.25%)
2013	TV (32.8%)	TV (22.7%)
	Online, Mobile Platform (19.25%)	Online, Mobile Platform (9.25%)
2014	TV (70.1%)	TV (81.9%)
	Online, Mobile Platform (40%)	Online, Mobile Platform (21.1%)
2015	TV (66.6%)	TV (77.9%)
	Online, Mobile Platform (48.9%)	Online, Mobile Platform (34.9%)

2016	TV (83.7%)	TV (76.6%)
	Online, Mobile Platform (17.4%)	Online, Mobile Platform (33.2%)
2017	TV (83.7%)	TV (88.3%)
	Online, Mobile Platform (17.4%)	CD/DVD (11%)
2018	TV (70.5%)	TV (69.3%)
	Online, Mobile Platform (25.5%)	Online, Mobile Platform (46.2%)
2019	TV (70.6%)	TV (82.7%)
	Online, Mobile Platform (50.5%)	OTT (34%)
2020	TV (69.3%)	TV (81%)
	Online, Mobile Platform (46.2%)	Online, Mobile Platform (34.9%)

[Source] Global Research, KOFICE, MCST

< Table 6 > shows that Japanese consumers access *hallyu* and K-pop content via a versatile yet converged mediascape, including cable television and online and mobile platforms, rather than through a singular form of traditional media. In fact, TWICE became popular before its debut in Japan with the group's "TT" pose, which trended on Instagram among young Japanese women in their teens and 20s. When TWICE appeared on the NHK Kōhaku Uta Gassen in 2017, they were asked more about the "TT" pose than the song (이석, 2019). Girl's Generation gained popularity through YouTube and was able to attract 22,000 audience members for their first live show in Japan without proper media exposure. This indicates that Japanese youth access K-pop content through new media rather than relying on traditional mass media channels (고정민 외, 2011). Hence, K-pop's resilient popularity was backed by fandoms, where the digital generation could interactively connect using new media platforms.

Chapter V. Conclusion

The astonishing Korean Wave spread across Northeast Asia from the late-1990s. China and Japan continue to be South Korea's largest consumers of *hallyu* content. Nonetheless, the popularity of *hallyu* was met with anti-Korean sentiment, and the strong antagonism against South Korea in China and Japan negatively affected the spread of *hallyu*. In fact, broadcasts, including dramas and variety shows, and movies have been negatively influenced by anti-Korean sentiment. However, interestingly, K-pop's popularity has been resilient despite increasing animosity in both China and Japan. One factor that explains K-pop's resilient popularity is its relative apoliticism. On the supply side, the South Korean government did not plan the success of *hallyu* nor design effective policies until it started to cooperate with the private sector. Rather, the popularity of *hallyu* was driven by bottom-up movements from the civil sector. On the demand side, it was difficult for the Chinese and Japanese governments to regulate the consumption of *hallyu*, as consumers accessed K-pop content through various online media platforms that were vulnerable to piracy. Moreover, Chinese and Japanese consumers enjoy K-pop as a subculture that reflects diverse preferences and is not tied to politics. However, K-pop was not exempt from political influence, as the Korean government used it as a form of soft power diplomacy to positively influence Korea's nation brand. Also, anti-Korean sentiments and anti-*hallyu*

movements in China and Japan resulted from backlash caused by extreme nationalism and protectionism. Therefore, the resilience of K-pop's popularity despite anti-Korean sentiment cannot solely be explained by its relative apoliticism.

Thus, this paper argues that the underlying reason of the sustainability of K-pop in China and Japan is a sense of connectedness. The affinity of K-pop is analyzed with four variables: music, technology, the Korean entertainment industry, and the Chinese and Japanese fandoms. First, music has the power to universally communicate emotions and create bonds of understanding amongst K-pop listeners. Second, technology has enabled simultaneous and transnational access to K-pop content. Social media has also facilitated interactivity and connectivity between stars and fans. Third, the Korean entertainment industry's strategies have provided familiarity and intimacy to local consumers in China and Japan by using the total management system, glocalization, transmedia storytelling, and social media marketing. Fourth, the digital generation in China and Japan connected through fandoms, forming a collective identity and strong solidarity. Overall, these factors contributed to the resilient unity and connectedness of K-pop that led to its sustainable popularity despite anti-Korean sentiments in China and Japan. This study can be expanded to explain how this "connectedness" has fueled the recent worldwide popularity of K-pop outside of Asia as well.

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<div align="center">

< Appendix 1 > *Hallyu* Content

</div>

1. K-pop	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
China	32.3	37.8	59.5	61.5	70.7				53.4
Japan	77.5	70	71	77	67.8				67
Global	54.1	56.9	59.9	61.9	67.3				58.7
2. Drama	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
China	78.3	76	70.5	73	72.3				59
Japan	79.5	76.3	64.5	74.3	70				72.2
Global	58.2	53.5	49.5	46.8	50.9				50.9
3. Movie	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
China	42	40	34	52.5	51.5				40.6
Japan	42.5	36	34	43.5	42.2				54.8
Global	46.8	43.1	42.8	43.4	44.2				47
4. Korean Food	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020
China	61.8	69.3	55.5	55.5	54.8				42.2
Japan	39.8	33	42	31.5	32.2				30.6
Global	45.6	44.4	43.6	40	44.3				43.5

Q. Select all the contents you perceive as "*Hallyu*."

*Research Institute: Global Research, KOFICE, MCST

**Research Participants: Adults aged 15 to 59 who have experienced Korean cultural content

***Research Method: Online Panel Survey, Multiple Responses (%)

< Appendix 2 > South Korean Images (Top 2)

2012 [2012.02, n=5,600]	1	Drama (18.3%)
	2	K-pop (14.9%)
2013 [2012.11, n=5,600]	1	Korean Food (15.8%)
	2	Drama (12.9%)
2014 [2014.02, n=5,600]	1	IT (14.5%)
	2	K-pop (12%)
2015 [2014.11, n=5,600]	1	K-pop (17.2%)
	2	Korean Food (10.5%)
2016 [2015.11, n=6,500]	1	K-pop (20.1%)
	2	Korean Food (12.1%)
2017 [2016.11, n=7,800]	1	Korean Food (12.5%)
	2	K-pop (12.1%)
2018 [2017.11, n=7,800]	1	K-pop (16.6%)
	2	North Korea (8.5)
2019 [2018.11, n=7,500]	1	K-pop (17.3%)
	2	Korean Food (9.9)
2020 [2019.09, n=8,000]	1	K-pop (18.5%)
	2	Korean Food (12.2)

Q. What is the first image when you think about Korea?

*Research Institute: Global Research, KOFICE, MCST

**Research Participants: Adults aged 15 to 59 who have experienced Korean cultural content

***Research Method: Online Panel Survey

< Appendix 3 > KWSI & KWSCI

Korean Wave Status Index (KWSI)

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
China	3.58	3.64	3.16	3.45	3.26	3.23
Japan	2.62	2.61	2.6	2.5	2.86	2.82

*Definition: Index that indicates the current popularity and the degree of

popularization of the Korean Wave

**Measurement: Evaluated the local popularity from 1 to 5 of Korean dramas,

variety shows, movies, music, fashion/beauty, and food in countries.

***Interpretation:

[Popularization phase] 3.5≤KWSI≤5

[Diffusion phase] 2.5≤KWSI<3.5

[Minor interest phase] 0<KWSI<2.5

****n=500, n=500 respectively in China and Japan

Korean Wave Consumer Survey Index (KWSCI)

	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
China	126.48	127.68	104.78	112.67	117.68	121.8
Japan	71.54	77.6	77.97	85.18	94.25	88.72

*Definition: Index that indicates the degree of growth or decline of the Korean

Wave.

**Measurement: Evaluated Korean popular culture product expenditures based on

the respondent's personal and societal perspectives compared to the year before and

estimates for the year ahead. These responses are converted to scores out of 100.

KWCSI

$$= \frac{(Very\ Positive \times 1.0 + Relatively\ Positive \times 0.5 + Neutral \times 0.0 - Relatively\ Negative \times 0.5 - Very\ Negative)}{Total\ Respondants} \times$$

100 + 100

Total KWCSI=Mean of (Expected Individual KWCSI + Current Society KWSCI + Expected Society KWSCI + Current Individual Expenditure KWCSI + Expected Individual Expenditure KWCSI)

***Interpretation

[Declining *Hallyu*] 0≤KWSCI≤99

[Intermediate *Hallyu* Growth] 100 ≤KWSCI≤129

[High *Hallyu* Growth] 130≤KWSCI≤200

****n=500 for both China and Japan

Source: 전종근 외.

<Appendix 4 > South Korean Cultural Content Exports to China (2000-2018)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Content Solution								16425	15839	16018	17,331	20,322	20,688	22,338	24,287	24,921	24,748	26,014	27,783
Knowledge Information								29017	32003	33102	33,621	36,287	39,586	41,534	42,356	46,878	48,329	58,616	56,505
Character						6094	43968	31396	38346	43593	49,368	89,257	85,347	96,587	102,233	118,563	124,461	132,059	158,423
Broadcast	1042		4537		6724		12441	4752.7	8097	1103	20,954.8	21,268.8	13,162.02	35,025	109,629	63,702	93,955	68,435	60,540
Animation			28		194	471	164	127	1136	1356	1,577	1,659	1,712	1,603	1,848	2,162	1,825	2,188	7,629
Movie	278		1862		206		1144	824	1306	1578	966	1,628	2,008	3,966	10,961	11,221	11,446	7,733	17,164
Game			42000	95000	153000		159000	241000	292,000	433059	595,864	907,296	1,018,676	1,048,144	957,331	1,057,119	1,379,942	3,413,471	2,981,534
Music			557				850	1665	1844	2369	3,627	6,836	8,806	10,186	52,798	89,761	98,362	109,931	111,962
Comic				1088	163	290	388	392	421	432	568	662	829	986	1,241	1,492	1,325	1,367	2,461
Publication	8273		3908		10570	13457	15500	22489	19373	37356	23,790	33,693	37,508	45,430	38,541	34,888	28,375	17,402	17,765

Amount (US$, thousands)

[Source] KOCCA (한국콘텐츠진흥원), KOSTAT (통계청), MCST (문화체육관광부-문화셈티)

* The data includes China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan.

< **Appendix 5** > South Korean Cultural Content Exports to Japan (2000-2018)

Amount (US$, thousands)

	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
Content Solution						12,357		35,632	35,341	36,332	37,426	43,469	43,474	46,256	50,887	54,005	59,132	64,742	70,390
Knowledge Information						11,273	2,706	102,687	138,218	139,338	141,322	176,925	178,686	189,563	199,543	214,002	231,324	244,891	244,087
Character						13,837	6,536	4,638	12,782	14,631	16,457	20,256	22,868	25,200	30,233	34,742	41,287	45,051	68,245
Broadcast	1,926		2,450		35,181	65,511	47,632.10	53,494.00	65,627.00	65,279	49,712.80	102,058.2	112,087.5	138,687	79,017	70,975	79,902	81,952	95,783
Animation	1,222		15,180		16,245	24,705	15,014	12,692	16,851	17,369	18,810	21,688	21,421	19,969	20,169	23,529	26,254	26,461	32,681
Movie	5,279		6,582		40,401		10,385	5189	8,989	5,945	2,258	3,663	9,679	8,085	4,474	4,956	4,314	4,895	4,591
Game			23,000	11,000	97,000	240,545	217,726	242,892	227,524	328,827	435,254	652,556	703,368	725,012	910,064	690,722	600,810	824,036	907,991
Music			2,246			801	14,309	9,431	11,215	21,638	67,267	157,938	189,512	221,739	235,481	242,370	277,292	320,599	367,335
Comic			419	589	190	339	770	638	616	597	1,527	6,639	5,507	6,766	7,015	8,165	9,154	9,742	11,601
Publication	17,974		18,279		35,703	43,124	28,864	24,888	25,147	31,362	30,204	29,810	61,289	74,560	60,584	55,026	46,585	33,606	39,911

[Source] KOCCA (한국콘텐츠진흥원), KOSTAT (통계청), MCST (문화체육관광부-문화셈터)

<Appendix 6> South Korean Government's *Hallyu* Policies, Systems, and Laws

Government Administration	Policy	System	Law
Kim Young Sam	[1993.07] "Five-Year Plan for the Development of New Korean Culture"	[1993.03]Reorganization of "Ministry of Culture" to "Ministry of Culture and Sports"	
	[1997.10.20] "Cultural Vision 2000 Plan"	[1994.05.04] Establishment of the "Bureau of Culture and Industry"	
Kim Dae Jung	[1999] "Five-Year Plan for Cultural Industry Development"	[1998.02] Reorganization of "Ministry of Culture and Sports" to "Ministry of Culture and Tourism"	[1999.02] "Framework Act on the Promotion of Cultural Industries" Revision of the "Act on Records, Videos, and Games"
	[2000.02] "Cultural Industry Vision 21"		
	[2001] "Content Korea Vision 21"		
	[2001.08] "Strategy for Supporting the Korean Wave Industry" by the Ministry of Culture and Tourism		[2002.08] "Publication and Printing Promotion Act"
	[2002.02] "Council of Asian Cultural Exchanges"		
Roh Moo Hyun	[2003.06] "Asia Culture Industries, Korea Foundation"		[2006.04.28] "Music Industry Promotion Act"

	[2003.12] "The Participatory Government's Cultural Industry Policy Vision to Realize the Top Five Cultural Powers in the World"		
	[2005.01] Private Advisory: "*Hallyu* Policy Advisory Committee"		
	[2005. 02.01] "Korean Wave Support Policy Council" by the Office for Government Policy Coordination		[2009] "Cultural Industry Promotion Basic Act"
	[2005.02] Cabinet meeting on the "Persistence and Diffusion of the Korean Wave"		
	[2005.07] Cultural Power "C-KOREA 2010"		
Lee Myung Bak	[2009] "Strategy for Leading the Korean Wave"	[2008.03] Reorganization of "Ministry of Culture and Tourism" to "Ministry of Culture, Sports and Tourism"	[2011.11] "Artists Welfare Law"
	[2010] "Promotion Work on Four Points for Promoting and Expanding New *Hallyu*"		
	[2011.06] "Measures to Strengthen Global Competitiveness of the Pop Culture Industry"		

	[2012.01.30] "Strategies for Creative Development of Traditional Culture"		
	[2012.02.28] "Strategies for the Development of Korean Culture and Arts along with the World"	[2012.01.30] "*Hallyu* Culture Promotion Group"	
	[2012.04.17] "Strategy for Global Competitiveness of Content"		
	[2012.04.03] "Advisory Committee on the Promotion of Korean Wave Culture"		
	[2012.04.27] "Korean Wave Support Council"		
	[2012.06] "International Forum on Cultural Communication"		
Park Geun Hye	[2015] "Expanding Cultural Territories through the Korean Wave"	[2014.03] "Association of Korean Wave 3.0"	[2013.12.10] "Basic Culture Act"
	[2015.12.18] "Public-Private Cooperation for Development of *Hallyu* in 2016	[2015.06.19] "*Hallyu* Planning Group"	[2013.12.31] "Act on the Development of Popular Culture and Art Industry"
Moon Jae In	[2017.07.19] "Kind *Hallyu*"		[2017.03.02] "International Cultural Exchange Promotion Act"

[Source] KOFICE (한국국제문화교류진흥원), MCST (문화체육관광부), 국가기록원

논문 초록

반한 감정에도 불구하고 지속되는 케이팝의 인기: 중국과 일본을 중심으로

전지민
국제학과 국제협력전공
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20세기 말 동북아시아로부터 불어온 한류 열풍으로 현재까지도 중국과 일본이 한국의 최대 문화 콘텐츠 수출국이다. 그러나 한류의 인기와 동시에 정치, 외교, 역사적 역학 관계로 중국과 일본에 자리 잡은 '반한'감정은 한류의 지속가능성을 불안정하게 했다. 이는 콘텐츠의 하위분류에 따라 상이한 결과가 나타나는데, 드라마나 예능을 포함한 방송 콘텐츠나 영화는 반복적으로 수출액이 급락하는 현상이 관찰된다. 반면에 음악은 이러한 정치나 외교적 영향을 상대적으로 받지 않고 인기를 지속적으로 유지하는 현상을 볼 수 있다. 먼저, 케이팝이 반한 감정에 크게 영향을 받지 않는 이유는 상대적으로 정치와 무관하기 때문이다. 공급 측면에서 한류는 한국 정부가 이끌지 않은 '설계되지 않은 성공'이었고, 바텀-업으로 민간의 주

도하에 이루어졌다. 수요 측면에서 케이팝은 중국과 일본 정부로부터 규제되기 어려웠고, 소비자들은 케이팝을 정치와 무관한 하위문화이자 여가로 즐겼다. 그러나 케이팝 역시 정치적인 영향력에서 완전히 배제될 수 없다. 따라서 본고는 케이팝의 지속적인 상승세를 '연결성 (connectedness)'으로 분석하고자 한다. 음악이라는 문화예술은 감정의 소통이 가능하여 공감을 형성한다. 기술의 발전은 시·공간을 넘어 케이팝 콘텐츠에 대한 접근성을 향상해주었고, 소셜 미디어는 스타와 팬 사이의 상호작용을 촉진했다. 한국 엔터테인먼트는 체계적인 인재 양성, 현지화 전략, 트랜스미디어 스토리텔링, 소셜 미디어 마케팅, 등을 통해 중국과 일본 소비자들에게 친근감을 형성했다. 중국과 일본의 디지털 세대로 이루어진 팬덤은 정체성을 함께 공유하며 단단한 결속력을 이루었다. 위와 같은 요인들로 인해 케이팝은 완강한 연결성을 가질 수 있었고 이는 중국과 일본에서의 강한 반한 감정에도 불구하고 케이팝이 지속해서 성공할 수 있도록 기여했다. 결론적으로, 케이팝이 반한 감정에도 불구하고 인기를 지속할 수 있었던 이유는 음악적 동감, 기술 네트워킹, 전략적 글로컬 친밀감, 팬덤 연대이고, 이는 연결성으로 사료될 수 있다.

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주요어 : 케이팝, 반한 감정, 중국, 일본, 연결성

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